

# TRINCO DIALOGUE MARITIME SYMPOSIUM - 2022

**SRI LANKA NAVY : ROADMAP TO FUTURE**



21<sup>ST</sup> OCTOBER 2022

ORGANIZED BY  
JUNIOR NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE  
NAVAL AND MARITIME ACADEMY



# TRINCO DIALOGUE 2022

## MARITIME SYMPOSIUM EIGHTH EDITION

**SRI LANKA NAVY : ROADMAP TO FUTURE**

## **Editor – in – Chief**

---

Commander (C) DMAB Dissanayake, RSP\*, USP, psc

## **Editor**

---

Commander Ravi Prakash (Indian Navy)

## **Editorial Committee**

---

Lieutenant Commander (ASW) TRCB Thennakoon, RSP\*, psc

Lieutenant Commander (PWO) KKC Udayanga, RSP, psc

Lieutenant Commander (IT) JHS Nilanga

## **Graphic Work**

---

LIT TNE Perera

LIT WMD Dodamwala

## **Steering Committee**

---

Commodore KDDC Fernando, RSP, USP, rcds

Captain (G) HBK Manjula, RSP\*, USP, psn

Commander (C) DMAB Dissanayake, RSP\*, USP, psc

## **Directing Staff Junior Naval Staff College**

---

Captain BGFA Wikramasuriya, RSP\*, psc

Commander (C) DMAB Dissanayake, RSP\*, USP, psc

Commander Ravi Prakash (Indian Navy)

Lieutenant Commander (ASW) TRCB Thennakoon, RSP\*, psc

Lieutenant Commander (PWO) KKC Udayanga, RSP, psc

1. Forward
2. Concept-Trinco Dialogue 2022
3. Programme
4. Opening Remarks
5. Keynote Address
6. **Reviving the Naval Thinking: Pragmatism in Pursuit of National Interest**  
Commander (N) CRP Walakuluge, MPA (NUS), Executive Officer, SLN Dockyard
7. **An Era of Peace: Post War Progression of Sri Lanka Navy**  
Lieutenant Commander (N) WGGCDJ Wajirasooriya and Lieutenant Commander (E) HMAB Herath (Student Officers, 31<sup>st</sup> JNSC)
8. **National Security Strategy and Priorities in Post-war Sri Lanka: Perspective on Changing Dynamics of Terrorism**  
Ms Sinduja Jayaratne, Senior Lecture, Faculty of Strategic Studies (Kotelawala Defence University)
9. **Future Challenges for Sri Lanka Navy: Maritime Security**  
Lieutenant Commander LUAWC Lansakkara and Lieutenant Commander (SBS) BMR Gunaratne (Student Officers, 31<sup>st</sup> JNSC)
10. **Roadmap for a Strong and Effective Navy: General Aspects and Force Structuring**  
Lieutenant Commander IDMSM Thennakoon and Flt Lt SADTC Senanayake (Student Officers, 31<sup>st</sup> JNSC)
11. **Roadmap for A Strong And Effective Navy: Professional Mastery Of Element Of Fighting Power Through Behavioural Changes**  
Commander (G) ERPK Udukumbura, RSP\*, USP, psc, MSc (D&SS), Fleet Training Officer (Major Vessels) I

## FORWARD

1. The Trinco Dialogue is an annual maritime symposium conducted by Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee. The inaugural session of Trinco Dialogue was conducted by the Junior Naval Staff College (JNSC) on 28<sup>th</sup> November 2011 under the astute guidance of Commandant Naval and Maritime Academy. The objective of this annual maritime symposium is to provide a platform for officers of Junior Naval Staff College to discuss, deliberate and expand the horizons and other young officers to enhance their knowledge on various subject matters related to contemporary maritime and military issues. The theme of first symposium was 'Identifying maritime challenges through dialogue'. The second Trinco Dialogue was conducted on 27 October 2012 with the theme of 'Collaborative Maritime Security through Modern Technology' and third was conducted on 07 Jan 2014 with the theme of 'Combating Maritime Disorder in IOR through Collaborative and Collective Response of Regional Navies. The fourth edition of Trinco Dialogue was held on 08<sup>th</sup> November 2014 under the theme of 'Maritime heritage of Sri Lanka and quest to become a maritime nation'. The fifth Trinco Dialogue was successfully conducted under the theme of 'Managing maritime domain of Sri Lanka' on 16<sup>th</sup> January 2016.

2. The Trinco Dialogue 2018 (Seventh edition) commenced with lighting the traditional oil lamp by the chief guest and other distinct invitees. The Commandant, Naval and Maritime Academy Commodore KG Paul, USP, nswc, MAIR, BA(DS)Hons delivered the opening remarks. The keynote address was given by the Chief Guest, Commander Eastern Naval Area Rear Admiral SMDK Samaraweera, RSP & Bar, USP, ndc. The Chief Guest inaugurated the forum for an effective discussion whilst emphasizing the fact that the strategic importance of Trincomalee Harbour on driving Navy's Maritime Strategy 2025. He also commended the dedication of the JNSC and the Naval and Maritime Academy towards the successful culmination of Trinco Dialogue 2018.

3. However, the event has not been taken place from 2019 to 2021 due to COVID 19 pandemics issue. The eighth edition of Trinco Dialogue maritime symposium will be organized by the Junior Naval Staff College of NMA under the profound leadership of Commandant Naval and Maritime Academy Commodore KDDC Fernando, RSP, USP, rcds which is scheduled to be held on 21<sup>st</sup> October 2022 at Wasantha Karannagoda

Auditorium, Trincomalee. The Deputy Chief of Staff and the Commander Eastern Naval Area will be the Chief Guest. He will also deliver the keynote speech followed by the opening remarks by the Commandant Naval and Maritime Academy. The Trinco Dialogue 2022 will be conducted under the theme of 'SRI LANKA NAVY: ROADMAP TO FUTURE' in three sessions and a total of six papers will be presented including papers by three guest speakers.

# STUDENT OFFICERS - 31<sup>ST</sup> JNSC



LCDR (N) LUAWC  
LANSAKARA



LCDR (C) KND  
PERERA



LCDR (E) HMAB  
HERATH



LCDR (C) JKDS  
RANASINGHE



LCDR (N) IDMSM  
THENNAKON



LCDR (N) WGGCDJ  
WAJIRASOORIYA



LCDR (C) WKM  
MPB AMARAKOON



LCDR (E) MAMW  
JAYAWARDANA



LCDR (L) PAY  
SANKALPANA



LCDR (PRO) PR  
RAJAPAKSHA



LCDR (S) RPNNWP  
RAJAPAKSHA



LCDR (SBS) BMR  
GUNARATHNA



LCDR AMTDB  
ATHAUDA



LCDR (IND) TK  
MANJUSHA



LT (L) MKAB  
MAYASINGHE




LT (INF) KKNC  
KODITHUWAKK



LT (VNF) L HAR  
CHAMARA



LT ADH  
SHASHIKALA



FLT LT SADTC  
SENANAYAKE

# DIRECTING STAFF OF THE JUNIOR NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE



CAPT (ND) BGPFA WICKRAMASURIYA, RSP & Bar, psc



CDR (C) DMAB DISSANAYAKE, RSP<sup>+</sup>, USP, psc



CDR (ASW) RAVI PRAKASH (Indian Navy)



LCDR (ASW) TRCB THENNAKOON, RSP & Bar, psc Msc (D&SS)



LCDR (PWO) KKC UDAYANGA, RSP, psc

1. Culminating a decade ago, the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) fought a protracted war against terrorism, showcasing her resilience and professionalism. Time and a well-deserved era of peace, should not dim the sacrifice, glory, achievements and lessons learnt. Imbibing the lessons of the past, SLN must envision its future, adapting to the new challenges and opportunities. Geography and geopolitics favour the Pearl of the Indian Ocean; Sri Lanka. However, the ways and means to capitalise these need to be highlighted: a well-defined maritime strategy, cooperation with all the maritime stakeholders to meet national interests is a necessity. With evolving geopolitical scenario, the vitality of SLN in establishing and preserving a conducive maritime environment must be acknowledged.

2. Being an island nation maritime challenges are central in deciding national policies. The kinds of maritime challenges Sri Lanka faces today must be identified and predicted. An analysis of these challenges would be required to bring out how they would affect the role of Sri Lanka Navy in time to come. Best models/ capabilities, including Command and Control structures must also be discussed to highlight whether non-conventional or modern challenges could be singly handled by the Navy or involvement of other agencies is required.

3. In this context it is required to bring out the sources/factors determining the envisaged future capabilities of the Navy. Subsequently, it must also suggest the ways and means to achieve them by analysing the options of capital acquisitions/leasing, international treaties/ agreements/bilateral/trilateral partnerships etc. A realistic analysis of present economic capabilities vs aspirations for future navy must also be weighed. In this aspect, the economy of efforts (sharing of assets/cooperation etc), optimal utilisation of resources and restructuring of forces could be an opportunity. The ingredient to a future navy is binding of mechanical assets with human resources with well-established SOPs. A blueprint to acquire more role worthy assets and capabilities is the need of the hour. Further, the existing training methodology of the Navy must be critically analysed to bring out shortfalls. Thereafter, it is required to suggest the changes required to be introduced in training to match with the aspirations of a professional force. It would be prudent to discuss and replicate/modify as per

requirement, existing training models in the world class navies. The importance of joint approach in the field of training and its benefits should also be identified.

4. The above archetype could be summarized as “Sri Lanka Navy: Roadmap to future” and will be discussed with intellectuals in the maritime domain and SLN operational level officers, with the guidance from superiors.

## PROGRAMME

### 'SRI LANKA NAVY: ROADMAP TO FUTURE'

<b><u>TIME</u></b>	<b><u>ACTIVITY</u></b>
0815	Arrival of participants
0825	Arrival of Chief Guest
<b><u>INAUGURAL SESSION</u></b>	
0830	NMA Anthem
0833	Lightning of Traditional Lamp
0835	'Trinco Dialogue' introduction video clip
0840	Welcome Dance
0845	Launching of 'Trinco Dialogue 2022'
0850	Opening Remarks by Commandant Naval and Maritime Academy Commodore KDDC Fernando, RSP, USP, rcds
0900	Keynote Address by Deputy Chief of Staff & Commander Eastern Naval Area Rear Admiral KJ Kularatne, RSP*, USP, psc
<b><u>SESSION ONE</u></b>	
0910	Introduction of first Moderator by Master of Ceremony
0915	Introduction of first speaker by the Moderator Moderator: Lieutenant Commander (PWO) KKC Udayanga, RSP, psc
0920	Paper by Commander (N) CRP Walakuluge, MPA (NUS) 'Reviving the Naval Thinking: Pragmatism in Pursuit of National Interest'
0940	Introduction of second speaker by the Moderator
0945	Paper by Lieutenant Commander (N) WGGCDJ Wajirasooriya and Lieutenant Commander (E) HMAB Herath 'An Era of Peace: Post War Progression of Sri Lanka Navy'

- 1005 Discussion
- 1020 Final comments and summary of two papers by first moderator
- 1030 Photo session for nominated group and refreshments

## **SESSION TWO**

---

- 1100 Introduction to second Moderator by Master of Ceremony
- 1105 Introduction of third speaker by the Moderator  
Moderator: Lieutenant Commander KND Perera
- 1110 Paper by Ms Sinduja Jayaratne  
Senior Lecture, Faculty of Strategic Studies (Kotelawala Defence University)  
'National Security Strategy and Priorities in Post-war Sri Lanka :  
Perspective on Changing Dynamics of Terrorism'
- 1130 Introduction of fourth speaker by the Moderator
- 1135 Paper by Lieutenant Commander LUAWC Lansakkara, Lieutenant  
Commander (SBS) BMR Gunaratne  
'Future Challenges for Sri Lanka Navy: Maritime Security'
- 1155 Discussion
- 1210 Final comments and summary of two papers by second Moderator
- 1220 Break

## **SESSION THREE**

---

- 1230 Introduction of third moderator by Master of Ceremony
- 1235 Introduction of fifth speaker by the Moderator  
Moderator: Commander (C) DMAB Dissanayake, RSP, USP, psc
- 1240 Paper by Lieutenant Commander IDMSM Thennakoon, Flt Lt SADTC  
Senanayake  
'Roadmap for a Strong and Effective Navy: General Aspects and Force  
Structuring'
- 1300 Introduction of sixth speaker by Moderator
- 1305 Paper by Commander (G) ERPK Udukumbura, RSP\*, USP, psc, MSc (D&SS)  
'Roadmap For A Strong And Effective Navy: Professional Mastery Of  
Element Of Fighting Power Through Behavioural Changes'

- 1325 Discussion
- 1340 Final comments and summary of two papers by third moderator
- 1345 Presenting of mementoes for the chief guest, Ms Sinduja Jayaratne, Cdr ERPK Udakumbura and Cdr CRP Walakuluge by the Commandant Naval & Maritime Academy
- 1350 Vote of thanks by Lieutenant (L) MKAB Mayasinghe
- 1355 National Anthem
- 1400 Departure of Chief Guest and lunch at Golden Lounge (On invitation)



## INAUGURAL SESSION

## OPENING REMARKS

**Commadore KDDC Fernando**, RSP, USP, rcds  
MSc(DS) Mgt, MA in IS & S (UK), AFNI  
**The Commandant, Naval & Maritime Academy**



1. The Commander Eastern Naval Area, flag rank officers, officers representing the Naval Headquarters, officers from sister services, guest speakers at the Trinco Dialogue 2022 including Ms Sinduja Jayarathne, Directing Staff of Naval and Maritime Academy, Officers, Officer under trainees, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and gentlemen, a very good morning to all.

2. The 'Trinco Dialogue' was an annual event of the calendar of Naval and Maritime academy counting seven years, though, we missed the event in last three years due to pandemics and various other reasons which is well aware of. But, today I am with much bliss and glee, delivering this opening remarks resuming the 8th edition of the Trinco Dialogue maritime symposium in year 2022. Let me be grateful to the Directing Staff and Student Officers of 31st Junior Naval Staff Course who took the initiative this year to recommence the event in full swing as it was before or even more. In this context Naval and Maritime Academy being the premier Naval Training Institution is standing tall with its profound synergy to expands the academic horizons of Sri Lanka naval personnel, while preserving the core naval values and all set to presents the eighth edition of 'Trinco Dialogue' today with deep sense of gratify. Therefore, I would like to congratulate student officers of 31st JNSC and the directing staff for making this event a reality this year again.

3. To speak a few word about the Trinco Dialogue, it sets the stage for officers who engage in operational and Tactical-operational level overlapping duties of Sri Lanka Navy, especially along with officers of friendly Navy's and officers of sister services to brainstorm, analyse, discuss and produce new knowledge with profound guidance from

the experts and superiors particularly in the maritime and naval domain. The panel of distinguished personalities who will be addressing this gathering today will surely enlighten the audience, with their wisdom, in making the future very promising and rewards. So I urge from this audience; specially the young officers to make the full use of this opportunity. In that, I would welcome warmly and pay my heartfelt gratitude for three of guest speakers who will be delivering their papers today at trinco dialogue; Ms Sinduja Jayarathne, Commander Priyadarshana Udukumbura and Commander Chaminda Walakuluge along with three moderators; Commander Anuruddha Dissanayake, Lieutenant Commander Chanaka Udayanga and Lieutenant Commander Danushka Perera and the student officers who have contributed with their papers to the event. Ms Sinduja Jayarathne is a lecturer at Kotelawala Defence University and her subjects of interest are political sciences, terrorism, violent extremism and intelligence which is well cohesive with the exploring topic. About the Commander Priyadarshana Udukumbura, he is a gunnery specialist and a qualified air observer as well as a proud attendee at both Defence Services Command and Staff College, Sri Lanka and Joint Services Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom. To mention a few words about Commander Chaminda Walakuluge, he is a navigation specialist and a Master's degree holder from National University of Singapore. And he has authored many publications and research work both in local and foreign academia.

4. Finally I wish to pay my gratitude to the Chief Guest and today's keynote speaker, Rear Admiral KJ Kularatne, RSP\*, USP, psc the Deputy Chief of Staff of Sri Lanka navy and the Commander Eastern Naval Area for accepting the invitation to grace the event. While accepting the fact that future generations will shape the future navy with their innovative thinking, I must emphasize that the experience of veterans has no substitute. The generation ahead must learn from the experience of the keynote speaker as well as invited speakers that they have amassed over the years in respective fields. Through this endeavour Sri Lanka Navy expect to groom its future generations with confidence and competence. Making that statement true, I think Rear Admiral Jayantha Kularathne is the best suited person to be the key note speaker of Trinco Dialogue maritime symposium 2022 and give us the kick start the event.

With that ladies and gentleman, I thank you again for your presence at this Admiral Wasnatha Karannagoda Auditorium today to witness and prosper your knowledge further after hearing to Trinco Dialogue maritime symposium 2022. Thank you very much.

**Rear Admiral KJ Kularathne**, RSP\*, USP, PSC, MMaritimePol(Aus),  
MSc(D&SS) (India), DIP in CR, MNI  
**The Commander Eastern Naval Area**



1. The Commandant Naval and Maritime Academy, Flag Rank Officers, Officers from sister services, Special Invitees, Directing staff of Naval and Maritime Academy, Officers, Officer under trainees, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and gentlemen, a very good morning to all. First, I would like to thank the Commandant Naval and Maritime academy for resurfacing this maritime symposium after few years of silent and inviting me to deliver keynote address. Certainly, I am delighted to be present here and deliver the keynote address on the 'Trinco Dialogue 2022' with its theme as 'Sri Lanka Navy: Roadmap to future', I am here because the theme is very close to my heart. Let me start by going back in time to provide a context.

2. When we gained our independence in 1948, Sri Lanka had an economy second only to Japan in the whole of Asia. The nation was looking forward to take a leap into the future and so was the Navy. Blueprints took some time to materialize and then in the period between 1958 and 1960, the navy acquired a number of assets and grew in manpower. The vision to be an effective navy was challenged and interrupted due to unavoidable circumstances. However, the naval leadership persisted in its efforts to contribute to the national development and of the navy. The growth of the navy was slow but steady and this is what need of the hour then was. The period from 1972 to 1980 was a time when the Navy again acquired a number of seaworthy vessels which was inadequate to deter developing threats. Further, the destiny had different plans when the war broke out in 1983 pulling down the economic growth and in effect trajectory of the navy. Sri Lanka had to pay the price for not having an effective navy, resulting decades long conflict. At the same time, the challenges posed to the navy increased many folds. This was the navy that I joined in Jun 1987.

4. While the first phase of the war ended soon, even in my limited experience in the Navy, I knew that this was not the end and the Sri Lanka Navy would be playing a vital role. But what we did not know, was that how long it would continue to destroy our beautiful country. During the period of war, force planning of the navy was mainly focused on the perceived threat and therefore we acquired a large number of small but fast crafts. Over the two decades, I witnessed an evolution of our tactics, manpower and of the overall naval strategy. The growth intangible and tangible elements of our Naval power through the conflict ensured the end of the war in 2009, Where militarily Sri Lankan forces defeated the war.

5. The end of the war brought in an era of much deserved peace. Being an island nation, the seas are the vistas of our prosperity. The maritime geography is indicative of the rich maritime heritage of the country and the opportunities to ensure economic prosperity. Almost all of our exports and imports are through the maritime routes. Today the Indian Ocean is the strategic center of gravity of the world. It accounts for over half of world's container traffic, a third of cargo shipments and 80 % of oil shipment transiting the oceans.

6. But as we know peace is never permanent. It is often threatened by new set of challenges. The spectrum of threat has shifted from conventional to non-traditional - Gun running, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, terrorism, marine pollution etc. The Sri Lanka Navy has kept at pace with the threats by acquiring a number of suitable platforms and tailoring the tactics. However, it's a battle of measures and countermeasures, thus we need to continuously think of new ways to be role worthy. The Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka outlines a vision for the navy with adequate focus on capacity building and capability enhancement. The future navy must be an effective navy in the aspects of platforms, trained human resources, moral and conceptual elements.

7. Our Navy set a medium size fleet expansion goal targeting 10 new vessels in Sri Lanka Navy 2025 plan as part of other expansion of blue water operations, since 2017. As at now, we acquired 05 ships and latest would reach Sri Lanka on 02nd or 03rd November 2022.

8. Training facilities to train human resource, is very much important factor for the Sri Lanka Navy road map to few Bases and Advance training centers in the navy, such as Naval & Maritime Academy, Vidura, Shiksha, Nipuna and Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) are fully geared to provide required assistance. Long Courses, Staff Course (Naval Wing), NDC- SL are few examples to achieve this goal in addition our few berths at UK, USA, Australia, India, Bangladesh, etc.

9. The technological development is a vital factor, where, Sri Lanka Navy has Naval Boat Building Yard- Welisara, up to 500 tons Slip way facility at Galle and Trincomalee. Latest addition would be 4000 tons Floating Dockyard to Sri Lanka Navy from India, Which will be station at Trincomalee Harbour. All infrastructure facilities are identified and the project will be commenced very soon, once funds allocated. Navy is developed to elite fighting arms. Such as Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and Marines, in order to match with regional and international navies. In addition, all the navies required to provide Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). To address these issues we need to further develop training and other facilities for the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS).

10. Our navy should be capable of arresting Maritime disasters, such as equipment failures, navigational errors, adverse weather conditions, collisions, oil spills, etc. Sri Lanka Navy needs to work alongside with Sri Lanka Coast Guard and needs to equip with international standard equipment.

11. Our sea area is 27 times larger than the land. Sri Lanka Navy should able to address all Search and Rescue (SAR) missions in our SAR region. For this, we need to deploy major vessels at sea for a longer duration. Also, we need further develop and equip the Maritime Rescue Coordinating Center (MRCC) for quick response.

12. Naval welfare facilities, too required to be upgraded to better function of the future navy. Accommodation facilities and infrastructure, class rooms (smart), workshops, recreational facilities in and out of the Navy including holiday facilities, required to be improved.

13. Frequent conduct of Motivational lectures, Carrere Development programs in all levels, improving language and IT skills of all personnel to be addressed with a sound programme. Medical facilities including Counselling to be freely available for rehabilitation of required personnel.

14. What I just narrated, is not new to this gathering, but is important to provide a context to what you are going to discuss today in this forum. It was these experiences that made me and I feel it is my duty to pass on my experience, ideas and vision to you. I have been fortunate enough to be a part of training, operations and administration. I have seen the past, lived in present and I have a vision for the future. In that vision, it is you – the leaders and work force- who execute the plans and takes this battle hardened Sri Lanka Navy to greater heights. Rome was never built in a day and so would the transition of our navy. Therefore, let us infuse ideas, innovate, plan, discuss and act together to make a roadmap to the future and sail into it.

15. I would like to end by leaving you with a quote from Charles Darwin “It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change” Think and act over this. Also, practice Reading, Writing and Fighting every day. Thank you very much. Have a rewarding Trinco Dialogue Maritime Symposium.



## SESSION ONE

*'Sovereignty means nothing if not defended'*

**CRP Walakuluge, MPA(NUS)**  
Commander(N)



*"Professional dissent is not disloyalty; professional discussion is not denial; professional dispute is not mutiny. The path to truth lies in argumentation, not acclamation. Any organization without a little chaos, is dead." – William J. Holland Jr.*

### **Introduction**

1. Much has been written and conversed about Naval strategy, doctrines, concept of operations, maritime domain awareness, traditional-non-traditional security threats, freedom of navigation, balance between soft and hard power, maritime cooperation/law enforcement etc. However, yet we remain as a maritime nation and a Navy in particular unable to chart our way forward in building a credible Navy, let alone asserting our national interests. The *'Galle Dialogue'* maritime symposium was such an endeavour undertaken jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the Sri Lanka Navy to stimulate and advance Naval planning and thinking. How tangible the outcomes have transpired is anyone's guess.

2. While I do not expect the *'Trinco-dialogue'* to influence the national policy makers nor the maritime stakeholders, I'm aware to the fact that this is the ideal platform to inform our future naval leaders that *'yes we can'* and that there are alternative ways of thinking in the transformation of our Navy in the post war era. Thus, the key in transforming the Navy towards a credible force is by reviving our traditional Naval thinking and pursuing a pragmatic path.

3. The third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is defined by global market failures, sluggish economic growth, pandemics, global warming, rise of natural disasters, technological disruptions, rise of nationalism, war in Ukraine and great power competition between

the United States and China. Thus, the billion-dollar question is how are we to respond as a Nation and as a maritime stakeholder?

4. In this endeavour, the essay attempts to define the present context also reflecting upon history at drawing macro-insights how Naval thinking was influenced to draw parallels for acquiring a firm bearing. Building on this understanding, an effort is made to glance at the civil war period and Sri Lanka Navy's evolution until the military defeat of the LTTE terrorist outfit in 2009. Drawing critical insights from the above an attempt is made to underscore why pragmatism is the need of the hour in devising a strategy and doctrine for the Navy. Subsequently, an effort is made not to prescribe but to synergize the entire discussion in looking forward at understanding the playing field where we could sustainably assert ourselves in securing our sovereignty and national interests.

### **Thinking like Mahan**

5. Yes, that's what I mean. It's time we start thinking like Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Literally what I'm implying is not about sea control or power projection, but to take a leaf from history in understanding how Mahan responded to the emerging power competition and geo-political realities of his era. The basis for this rationale is that what we experience today is a great power contention between the United States and China which is similar to what Mahan was keenly observing and influenced during his period.

6. Mahan was born into an age of wooden sailing vessels, coal used as main fuel and flags used for communications. By 1914, the age of sails had long gone with steam and oil power, steel hulls and electronic communications. No doubt he lived in an age of great transformation, which indeed is the basis for my argument that we need to think like Mahan; to be astute to the evolving realities and to have a pragmatic approach. He came of the age of the American civil war. Mahan's three volume thesis, *'The influence of sea power upon history (1660-1783)'*, was written for a country that was rising as a trading post and as an industrial power.

7. In our context we come of our own civil war that had ended over a decade. Mahan was observing the great power rivalry between industrializing America and

European imperialists, which is contextually true to define the world we live in today. He clearly comprehended the fact that sovereignty means nothing if not defended. And today we live in an era where asserting sovereignty has become a dilemma in a defaulted country. Certainly, the challenge for our Naval thinkers today is more daunting than what Mahan himself experienced, where we will need to look deep into our pockets before arriving at policy decisions that might boomerang to haunt and stall any further developments. It's a bit cynical, but let's be realistic, beggars can't choose!

8. Ideally there are two ways how one could embrace the philosophy of Mahan's thinking. One is the exact way how the Indian and the Chinese navies are going about with their respective force structuring. While the major fleets including the U.S Navy has scaled down the billion-dollar floating real estates, India and China are seeing taking forward the Mahanian tradition. This is understood given that both countries are looking into asserting themselves as major contenders of the next world order.

9. Mahan was fortunate that many policy and decision makers of his time were interested in his ideas. Theodore Roosevelt was a great admirer of his writings which eventually inspired the U.S Navy to expand across oceans as the greatest maritime power in human history.

10. The second alternative path is understanding and a proper appraisal of our enduring threats and challenges in our domain. Hence, equipping the Navy with the quantitative and qualitative devices that would ultimately ensure our Navy act as a core enabler in securing our national interests is a prerequisite.

### **Why Pragmatism?**

11. Over two decades back, the talk of our Naval gatherings was about transforming beyond a brown water Navy. This was a period when confrontations with the LTTE sea units were frequent and was eventually arriving towards its culminating point. In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Naval leadership was bold enough to convince the legislatures the need of a Naval air arm. Even a few young officers were selected for the initial pilot training. Despite all its potential the 'Naval Air Unit' project abruptly ended for reasons unknown. By the time we had already procured a Sukanya class Offshore-

Patrol-Vessel (OPV) and two Fast Missile Vessels(FMV) fitted with 'Gabriel mark-II' anti-ship missiles to our existing 'fleet' of vessels which included a mix of Chinese built Fast Gun boats(FGBs) and the Fast Attack Craft(FAC) as its main stay. The Navy's main effort by this time was securing and sustaining our sea lines of communications (SLOCs) supporting military operations in the Northern peninsula. In this sense Sri Lanka Navy's story during the civil war was a success amidst many sacrifices of our young men and women.

12. During the initial phases of the LTTE insurgency, Naval planning was not complex with the Army dictating terms of how, where and when to shape the battlefield. The Navy was considered as an extension of the combat support arms of the military. The Navy's role was more defined with a defensive posture; from providing harbour security, escorting and conducting sea convoys to manning rear defence lines. The acquisition of the FAC provided the Navy much needed offensive capabilities, where it no longer needed to play second fiddle in the counter insurgency campaign.

13. The second phase of the campaign (1990-1998) was a period of experimentation, losses and learning. During this period the Navy was aggressively rigging itself, reshaping and redesigning its tactical manoeuvres. Against all odds the Navy provided the platforms to conduct amphibious assault operations. The Special Boat Squadron (SBS) which was in its infancy was now flexing itself, often operating behind enemy lines, adding a new dimension into the offensive action. The FAC were becoming lethal assets and most feared by the LTTE. The LTTE sea movements were met with constant harassing fire and logistic movements disrupted. On ground, this was a period where the military had experienced major debacles. The T-55 tanks and the artillery batteries lost to the LTTE were finally destroyed or captured during the humanitarian operation (2006-2009).

14. With the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and the intervention of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) which predominantly consisted of representatives from Nordic countries, offensive action out at sea became more complicated. However, at a time when the military was confined to barracks the Naval leadership was bold enough to continue the offensive against the LTTE, who were violating the CFA blatantly at an unprecedented scale. Controversial may it be, this period also did provide the Navy with

an enduring advantage. The young cadets and recruits could be trained systematically, and the battle-hardened knowledge gained during the second phase of the campaign could be trickled down. This phase provided a formidable combination of tact and a warrior mentality that would go on to haunt the LTTE until its end at Nandikadal.

15. During the last phase of the anti-insurgency campaign or the Humanitarian Operation, the Navy had turned the tide and was taking the offensive to the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Navy had redefined asymmetric warfare out at sea, where once an element known to be invincible was on a death run. 'Swarm' tactics used through the formation of the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS), rings of defence off Mullaittivu and the destruction of the 7 LTTE floating warehouses in the high seas were remarkable feats in the context of contemporary warfare. These successes were not results of individual genius but the offspring of a collective effort in the transformation of the Navy over the years as a learning organization. The silos that pre-existed between departments, branches were dissolved. The supply chains revamped as Naval logistics, repairs, maintenance, welfare were at the core complimenting recruitment, training and operations.

16. Meanwhile, the maritime frontier was not cluttered as today with fishing restrictions imposed in the Northern waters. The frequent seaward confrontations between Naval units and LTTE craft deterred even fishing poachers off our waters. The 9/11 attack brought about the implementation of the ISPS code facilitating ports security, which the Navy had to respond actively bringing much more awareness and understanding into securing our ports and infrastructure from any sort of terrorist attack. Our Navy had commendably executed its task securing our seaports from terrorist attacks that could have crippled our entire economy. We need to bear the fact that by this time the Katunayake international airport and the Kolonnawa oil refinery had come under LTTE attacks. Later, the LTTE went onto carrying out a suicide bomb attack inside the Army headquarters.

17. Reverting to my question, why pragmatism now? The answer is that since 2009 we as a Navy has drowned ourselves in the euphoria of the military defeat of the LTTE and the asymmetric dimension we so championed that we literally shunned ourselves from responding to the much imminent, evident, profound and enduring challenges and

threats in our maritime frontier. There is a difference between having a stake and asserting it. To establish my argument, I would like to briefly present three different cases. One, a persistent challenge in our historical waters; the others more contemporary; the 'MV X-Press Pearl' fiasco and finally the more recent arrival of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) survey vessel 'Yuan Wang 5' at the Hambantota port.

### **Poaching in the Northern Waters**

18. This has been an enduring challenge to the Sri Lankan Navy, especially since the end of the conflict. I doubt the notion that we have been successful in deterring and denying poaching in our waters, despite intermittent arrest of such vessels. It is estimated that the annual loss of fishing yield due to poaching in the Northern waters amounts to at least USD 40 million. This is just the estimated direct economic cost. The indirect cost socially would be in great proportions also considering the impact on biodiversity. The Navy's response to my understanding has been linear with increasing sea patrols in the northern waters and these efforts have been exhausted over the years. Given the present dire financial situation even this approach is less likely to continue.

### **Response to Events in the Maritime Domain**

19. The MV X-Press Pearl caught fire 9.5 nautical miles off the coast of Colombo on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2021. The event clearly exposed the naked truth about the readiness, capacity and capability of the Sri Lankan authorities who in my view miserably failed to manage the crisis. To date this is the largest environmental catastrophe that Sri Lanka experienced in its known history. The fire could only be controlled after the Indian emergency support received on 27<sup>th</sup> May. The Sri Lankan effort failed due to the lack of an emergency response system, lack of expertise, lack of equipment and lack of safety procedures. This also brought about that fact that many countries shied away from assisting Sri Lanka. For a fact it's true that the scale of the issue was way beyond what we could handle. Ironically, it is well known that over the years the Navy in the shadows of the Sri Lanka Coast Guard have sent personnel to train and learn in responding to such situations. However, the Navy was at the mercy of others in explaining and laying

out a response plan. Interestingly, Sri Lanka is a signatory to the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention), since 1997.

20. Earlier, on 03<sup>rd</sup> September 2020 the oil taker 'MT New Diamond' caught fire off the South-eastern coast in our EEZ. This was also an awakening call of the possibility of negative implications towards our national interests due to accidents in our adjacent waters. The way in which these mentioned incidents were handled by the responsible authorities had come under much scrutiny. However, the incident surfaced a naked fact that how we lacked the necessary resources and know how to mitigate and manage such disasters. Similarly, a fire broke-out on-board 'MSC Daniela' on 04th April 2017 off Colombo port. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility of another such event in our waters or any sort of sabotage activity on-board such liners that will result in grave economic and security implications in a scale that affects our economic survival, safety and security. India imports approximately 2.724 million metric tons of its refineries to its Eastern coast, while Bangladesh imports 1.4 million tons of crude oil from Middle East annually. The Very-Large-Crude-Carriers (VLCC) destined to these ports traverse through the southern tip of Sri Lanka. Thus, any accident between vessels in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) that lies just 10-12km from the southern-coast could result in grave and lasting negative social costs. Implications of such disaster would be propounding to our fragile economy and our bio-diversity. Thus, it is no exaggeration that the Navy needs to build its credibility as a first responder in its EEZ.

### **Increasing Strategic Capabilities**

21. In general, to operate and influence events in the maritime domain any Navy aspires core capabilities such as sea control, power projection, forward presence, maritime security, deterrence, and Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response(HA/DR). Today, the Sri Lankan Navy is a one-dimensional force with limited surface capabilities. This has provided contending parties to exploit our weakness. The recent PLAN survey vessel 'Yuan Wang 5' Hambantota port visit on 16<sup>th</sup> September 2022 is an ideal case study. Though the episode receded, the negativity that surrounded the entire event focused the spotlight of our strategic inability to influence or manage events in our domain. Clearly, Sri Lanka does not wish to be part of a regional power

contention between Indian and China. Incidentally, the Yuan Wang -5, being a Chinese survey vessel that monitors satellites, rockets, and intercontinental ballistic missile launches, it is no trivia that India gets excited knowing that Sri Lanka lacks the capacity in guaranteeing that the vessel does not operate its passive systems whilst at harbour. So isn't it righteous that the Navy invests and builds on such capacities/capabilities that augment in exercising and enforcing our sovereignty in our domain.

### **Protection of Submarine Cables**

22. Ninety five percent (95%) of global data or communication is made possible through undersea fibre optical cables. There are 5 such submarine cables linking Sri Lanka to the world. Any sabotage activity to such infrastructure would cause unprecedented damage to our national interests. Moreover, with the advent and proliferation of the 5G technology, reliance in submarine cables will ever increase. In addition, future application into military cannot be ruled out as geopolitically, the Indian ocean is churning into a field of supreme power contention. In the event of a severing or intended damage to a cable might provide an adversary with the initial advantage during a conflict through elimination of internet access to a targeted population, isolating government communications or even causing economic disruption. There is a particular case when an undersea cable broke down between Egypt and Italy in 2008, U.S drone operations in Iraq had significantly decreased from hundreds to tens a day.

23. The deduction from all these three different scenarios and the undeniable possibility with advent of technology is that we are ill prepared to neither deter the threats nor influence the challenges or the outcomes in our backyard. Certainly, this warrants a new way of thinking.

### **Thinking to Plan or Planning to Think**

24. We need a blueprint in transforming ourselves into a more relevant and credible Navy that could really be an active partner when it comes to having a stake in our maritime domain. If not, my worst fear is that we would become a destination for

redundant military hardware/ platforms at the cost of available credit facilities. It is no exaggeration that the cost of the infamous 'Lotus Tower' was around USD 113 million and the acquisition of 2 Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessels(AOPVs), exceeded this amount, eventually been deducted from the USD 400M Indian credit line meant as an economic stimulus package for a debt-ridden country.

25. Either way, in the verge of the 72<sup>nd</sup> commemoration of our Navy, it is well understood that we need to break the jinx. It cannot be ruled out that the Navy has not made an effort to chart a futuristic path. The 2025 Naval Strategy document and the latest publication of the BR-1 or the 'Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka' (MDSL) are proof to these efforts. However, apart from been instantaneous efforts both documents lack the depth that resonates the realities. The latter document had come under much criticism upon its publication which reasons are well understood. Further, an explanation to the apparent inconsistency in the Naval planning could be attributed to the internal political climate or the political blindness at the grand strategic level in appraising our national interests.

26. For a start the Navy may go forward appraising the necessary force structure or posture for at least for the next 20 years or beyond. It is no trivia that our present strength of 48,127 is way above what this country could manage, and it is a number that leaves many defence analysts shocked especially the manpower to asset to coastline ratio. Hence, it's time we take the discussion of right sizing the Navy to the centre of our planning process. Clearly, there's no rationale in maintaining such a large force and end of the day lamenting that only 8% goes out to sea.

### **Pursuing our National Interests?**

27. Simply, national interests reflect the enduring values and goals of a state. National Interests provide the rationale for a nation's/ state's existence. Clearly defined national interests provide the binding force of a state against existential threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Whilst the Democratic Socialist Republic is gearing -up to celebrate 75 years of independence, the very absence of defined national interests is evident enough to suggest our development path. It is my belief that national interests provide the wire frame for asserting security and prosperity of a state.

28. The BR-1 (MDSL) mentions eight national interests of Sri Lanka, which the parliament is yet to endorse or debate. Hence, I believe the Navy could take the leading role in convincing the polity in pronouncing 'what our national interests are?'. In this sense, an effort was made in 2018 in articulating a draft defence white paper. The drafts were handed over to both the President and Prime Minister's offices. Unfortunately, there has been no progress in realizing this.

29. It is my belief that the Navy should steer the dialogue of Sri Lanka accepting ourselves as a maritime nation and undoubtedly that is where our prosperity lies. It is the Navy that should take lead in convincing the polity and stakeholders that we need to think through to document our national aspirations around a maritime core.

### **Conclusion**

30. Having fought a gruesome war with a terrorist outfit, which to an extent operated a rudimentary conventional Naval force, the Sri Lanka Navy won much accolade internationally for its unique triumphs at sea. The successes at sea could be attributed to a clear understanding of its operational environment, threats and challenges and responding pragmatically. However, since the end of the LTTE insurgency the country and the Navy in particular are presented with more complex and enduring challenges in asserting as a credible force in its maritime domain.

31. We have lost a lot of good men. Not only to the war but to our sheer ignorance in making an effort to retain the best talent. Manpower was considered a luxury, but no more. We need to have an apprehension of the situation as the National coffers' dry day by day. We should try to see over the horizon not in the belief of some promise land, but in the belief that our taxpayers could trust in us to do our duty in defending our sovereignty, our national interests when it matters and where it matters out at sea.

32. Whilst the Sri Lanka Navy is gearing to commemorate 72 years as a force, it's time we create a new dialogue that could see us through these turbulent times so that we are best prepared to reap the fruits when it's opportune as the tide rises again. Thus, I would like to reiterate that having a stake and asserting it are different logics and sovereignty means nothing if not defended. It's an infinite playing field, so we need to understand the game, the players and the best possible outcome as we move forward.



**WGGCDJ Wajirasooriya**  
Lieutenant Commander (N)



**HMAB Herath**  
Lieutenant Commander (E)

*“A navy is a state’s main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, and how it fights is determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state’s goals, perceived threats, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and not least the way in which the state defines itself and its way of war.”z*

- George Baer-

*One Hundred Years of Sea Power (1993)*

## **INTRODUCTION**

1. With the end of the three decade long, protracted conflict in 2009, Sri Lanka entered a new era. The military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has resulted Sri Lanka with a peaceful environment that benefits not only economic growth but also gradual progress in a number of other areas. Since winning the war, the nation has concentrated all of its strategies on finding ways to achieve sustainable development.

2. Many defence professionals state in their analyses of the military battle that the Sri Lanka Navy's (SLN) contribution to victory was crucial in a number of ways. In a broader sense, the SLN's participation helped get rid of the Indian Ocean of maritime terrorism and gave people the chance to gain more from the vast span of ocean around the country. Because Sri Lanka is an island country and is situated next to one of the busiest water routes in the world in a strategically significant area, its future is clearly tied to the maritime realm.

3. In this environment, Sri Lanka is looking to the future with the aspirational goal of developing into a strategic hub for maritime activity in the Indian Ocean, where naval and maritime activity is essentially the main enabler for a number of reasons. Therefore, it is important to give the marine area our whole attention because the problems that lie ahead appear to be far more difficult than winning the war.

4. Due to Sri Lanka's reliance on the maritime sector for its future, it is imperative that the surrounding ocean mass be protected, monitored, and regulated in order to create a competitive and distinctive maritime hub in the area and bring about the much-anticipated economic progress focused on the maritime sector. By preparing to tackle the emerging challenges in maritime security, economic development, and positioning as a maritime centre in this competitive region, the SLN has a far wider role to play in this environment (Joseph, 2015).

5. It is not an exaggeration to say that the success of the SLN and its contribution to the broad national plan of realizing the full potential of the maritime domain will be a deciding element on the road to maritime glory and success. Hence, the researcher is realized that the importance of carrying out a study in order to identify the progression as well as lapses of SLN on achieving its objectives within the naval role of a peace era.

### **AIM**

6. This paper's aim is to critically analyse the progression of the Sri Lanka Navy from year 2009 to to-date while comparing and contrasting SLN's role and its objectives as a peace time Navy against SLN as a fighting power.

### **METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY**


7. The methodology used in this study is to evaluate the period of post war era (from 2009 up to-date) and understand the role of SLN in peace time as derived in the Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka (MDSL - BR 1), as well as, identify the objectives of SLN which have been mentioned in the Sri Lanka Navy's Maritime Strategy (SLNMS) 2025.

8. In addition, SLN has a significant role and responsibility as a fighting power, in order to achieve national security and interest. It is identified that, there are three major components such as Moral, Conceptual and Physical falling under the fighting power. In this paper it is compared and contrasted the moral and conceptual factors in relation to the MDSL and SLNMS 2025. Similarly, the Physical component of fighting power is compared and contrasted in relation to the man power, training, equipment and sustainability of SLN with the available past statistics.

9. Finally, it is identified what are the objectives already achieved and the objectives which were not achieved with the predetermined time frame as per SLNMS 2025. Then, critically analyse the unaccomplished objectives in order to forward recommendations and similarly, suggest recommendation for further progression/development for achieved objectives as well.

### **PEACE TIME ROLE IN SLN**

10. Role of the Sri Lanka Navy can be identified in two ways, war time and peace time role. To fulfil the requirement of countries' national interest, peace time and war time role has identical differences. Sri Lanka Navy successfully identified its role during thirty years of war and was able to wipe out LTTE terrorism in the country. Role of Sri Lanka Navy in peace time can be categorized under three main components such as military, diplomatic and constabulary (MDSL,2020).



**Figure 1:** SLN Peace Time Role.

**Source:** Constructed by Author according to the MDSL.

11. **Military Role.** The following aspects need to be covered by SLN as the military role in peace time:-

- a. Intelligence Collection and Surveillance.
- b. Protection of Maritime Trade.
- c. Media Operations.

12. **Diplomatic Role.** It is very much important to carry out under mentioned operations by SLN as diplomatic role in the peace time:-

- a. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.
- b. Hydrographical Surveys.
- c. Salvage Operations.
- d. Peace Keeping Operations.

13. **Constabulary Role.** Some of the operations and activities falling under the constabulary role of SLN:-

- a. Search and Rescue Operation.
- b. Conservation and Protection of Living, Non-living Resources and Marine Environment.
- c. Aid to Civil Power.
- d. Protection of Offshore Assets.
- e. Counter Immigration and Emigration Operations.
- f. Anti-smuggling and Human Trafficking Operations.
- g. Drug and Contraband Operations.
- h. Counter-Piracy Operations.

### **OBJECTIVES OF SRI LANKA NAVY BY 2025**

14. If an island nation is to achieve many milestones, particularly in terms of development goals, it needs a sound national maritime policy and a well-positioned naval maritime strategy that looks toward the future with confidence. The present

maritime scenario is a completely different version than what the country witnessed before 2009.

15. In order to ensure capabilities are effective and aspects such as deterrence, projection, internal security, etc... are achieved, the SLN's road map towards 2025 need to be based on the following key characteristics derived in the SLNMS-2025, and those will define what the SLN will be. The following elements should be recognized as the some of the main pillars of the strategy of SLN for planning, developing, and delivering present and future capabilities (SLNMS,2025);



**Figure 2:** SLN's Objectives as per the SLNMS 2025.

**Source:** Constructed by Author.


- a. **Professionalism.** Built on a foundation of professional men with the highest standards and values who are trained and educated to maintain the fighting edge; able to operate in and from the sea with a strong team ethos, cohesion and identity.
- b. **Operational versatility.** An operationally versatile navy capable of contributing to all operations at sea, on land, in the air and across the seams of those environments as an integral part of a Joint force.
- c. **Deployable.** SLN has to focus on the regional deployment as well as take part in multinational deployment opportunities. This will enable the SLN to promote and protect the Lanka's national interests by concentrating effort on the highest priority geographical areas.

- d. **Information Focused.** Technological innovation will continue to be important in the provision of all maritime capabilities. In addition to investing in ships and aircraft, SLN need to embrace on the emerging information and surveillance technologies and improve expertise at using information as a tool and a weapon.
- e. **Agility.** SLN need to continue to learn, exploit current operational knowledge to develop future requirements and thereby to react swiftly to the changing demands of an uncertain world. Relevant doctrine, training and necessary equipment will enhance SLN'S strategic utility.
- f. **The Right Expansion.** Successfully delivering these tasks requires a wide spectrum of capabilities provided mainly by a Fleet of effective ships, and expansion of Sri Lanka Coast Guard at suitable levels.
- g. **Decisive Leaders.** Develop and maintain a leadership culture that values initiative, decision - making, and trust while enhancing the management and leadership skills of SLN's future leaders (SLNMS,2020).

### **SRI LANKA NAVY AS A FIGHTING POWER**

16. The efficacy of the Navy in any military activity is known as combat power. It includes both tangible and intangible elements. The Navy's ability and capacity to engage in combat and prevail in maritime operations is defined by maritime fighting power. It is composed of the following essential combination of three connected elements (MDSL,2020):-


- a. Conceptual component (the thought process).
- b. Moral component (the ability to get people to fight).
- c. Physical component (the means to fight).



**Figure 3:** Component of Fighting Power.  
**Source :** Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka.

### **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY**

17. The defined maritime objectives in SLNMS in 2025 are to be achieved through peace time role of the SLN. Both the role and objectives of the SLN are driven by the components of fighting power i.e. Conceptual, moral and physical. Based on the fighting power and its components, the researchers will try to find what earlier derived objectives have been achieved or not and to give recommendation subsequently.



**Figure 4:** Conceptual framework of the study.

**Source:** Constructed by Author.

## **EVALUATING THE GENERAL OUTCOMES OF SLNMS 2025**

### **Achieved Objectives**

17. In general, it was discovered that the SLN consistently performed the key concepts outlined in the SLMS 2025 under subsection "Key areas in the national strategy which can be addressed by the Navy", i.e., maintaining a secure and resilient Sri Lanka, establishing a stable region and world, implementing a defense policy, protecting against foreign and internal aggression, maintaining maritime security, engaging in regional and national affairs, and fostering national development. Additionally, it clearly demonstrates how the SLN has persistently worked in these areas in the past and demonstrates a higher improvement in these areas.

### **Not Achieved Objectives**

18. The greatly desired need for a joint military doctrine embracing the tri-services to promote a common methodology under which should be functioned in a joint setting is described in SLNMS 2025, under the topic of "Joint military doctrine to support joint military strategy." However, it was discovered very little progress had been done in this area.

19. According to the SLNMS 2025 "Future SLN fleet: a twenty ship Navy, progress has been achieved partially since the year 2019. In addition to that, Equipment, Sustainability, manpower and training have also been recognized as partially achieved. As per the scope of the study, those aspects will be discussed in broadly under sections below.

### **SLN'S ROLE AND OBJECTIVES VERSES SLN AS A FIGHTING POWER**

20. The moral and conceptual components of the fighting power is addressed through the MDSL and the SLNMS 2025. Hence, Physical component of the fighting power has been evaluated by following available statistics;

### **Equipment**


21. Expanding SLN fleet, future SLN fleet (twenty ships Navy) concept is a good move for enhance SLN capabilities in order to meet future maritime challenges and also this can be considered as a post war progression step. This would be highly useful to uplift the military role and diplomatic role in the Navy. In order to achieve Command of the Sea, Sea Control, Maritime Power Projection, Preventive Deployments as well as to attend Peace Support Operations (PSO) we need to have considerable number of ships and craft.

22. As a post war Navy, we have achieved a significant progress in the Constabulary role. SLN established Naval Boat Building Yard (NBBY) in year 2000 to fulfill the small boat requirement of Navy to defeat LTTE close maneuvering crafts. Presently, NBBY is capable of providing sufficient number of small crafts to perform duties such as Aid to

Civil Power, Assist to other Government Departments, Search and Rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) etc. SLN equipped with well-trained Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS) and 4RU units especially for these SAR and HADR missions. Further, SLN Engineering department is presently carryout repairs of vessels of Sri Lanka Ports Authority and Road Development Authority such as “Wadatharaki” Ferry boat and pilot craft as an assist to other government departments.

23. When we look into number of ships which SLN going to have, as per the SLNMS 2025 , ‘Future SLN fleet: a twenty ship Navy’ have been made a moderate progress over the time since the year 2018 and the following table has highlighted the disparities between the projected and the present situation(SLNMS,2020).


**Table 1:** Disparities between Projected to 2025 and present SLN fleet.  
**Source:** SLNMS 2025.

Vessel/Craft	As at 2016	2018	2020	2022	2025	Total at 2025
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
Frigates	--	01	--	01(02)	--	02
Corvettes	--	01	--	01(02)	--	02
OPVs	04	01(05)	01(06)	01(07)	01(08)	08
FMVs	02	01(03)	--	01(04)	--	04
FPBs	02	--	01(03)	--	01(04)	04
FGBs	11	--	01(12)	--	01(13)	13
LCM/LCU	06	--	--	02(08)	--	08
FPCs	04	--	--	--	--	04
FACs	57	--	--	--	--	57
IPCs	73	--	--	--	--	73
Arrow	160	--	--	--	--	160
						

24. Considering the responsibility lies with Sri Lanka with the Search and Rescue (SAR) region that is 27 times of the land mass, SLN has to respond in case of any maritime emergency or disaster take place within this region as per international regulations. Therefore, SLN has projected a 20 ships requirement as at year 2025 in order to cater deep sea going capabilities. However as per above table, it is understood that present progress is considerably lacking behind than the projected plan.

## Sustainability


25. In order to sustain any organization, there should be a good logistic supply chain and same applicable to SLN also. Sustainability is a critical element that provides an effective fighting power. As an example, based on SLN Engineering Department Statistics under mentioned table provides the details of non-operational and semi operational FAC in SLN due to lack of funds to purchase relevant Major Over Haul (MOH) packages;



**Figure 5:** Non – Op/ Semi- Op FAC at ENA due to unavailability of MOH packages in 2022.

**Source:** Engineering Department ENA.

26. Further, following table indicated the remaining amount of SLN ships which are scheduled to go for dry docking in Colombo Dockyard PLC during this year but awaiting due to lack of funds.



**Figure 6:** SLN Docking Overdue Ships - 2022.

**Source:** Director Hull Engineering - SLN.

27. Above two tables clearly indicate that how bad SLN fleet has got affected due to low sustainability due to lack of funds and considerable amount of FAC are unable to deploy due to non-availability of spares and number of major ships being operated sparingly due to overdue docking repairs.

28. It is understood that, this situation has occurred due to prevailing bad economy in the country and it is inevitable for armed forces also to get affected from it. Further, this badly affected to professionalism, Operational Versatility and Deploying ability of SLN which considered as few key pillars in the direction for planning, developing and delivering capabilities of SLN and the deplorable results of this may raised in near future in several ways such as creating of less professional staff, low performances of machineries due to bad maintenance procedures etc.

## **Manpower and Training**


29. Manpower and Training is one of important factors which come under the physical component of Fighting Power. Human resources identified as the most important component of any organization for its future developments. Therefore, following objectives are derived in SLNMS 2025 (described above) for developing of manpower and training:-

- a. Professionalism.
- b. Agility.
- c. The Right Expansion.


30. The quantifiable goals for SLN manpower and training for the year 2025 are discussed below with statistics considering the following set of desires:-

- a. To develop a naval force that is professionally competent.
- b. To be identifying on core competencies unique to a naval force.
- c. To logically restructure the force structure in accordance with core competencies.
- d. Improve the sailors' skills in administration and competence within the system.

31. **Managing Human Factor**. The following figure 7 shows the current SLN sailor cadre based on the information available at DNP as of the year 2021. Figure 8 also shows the division of the Regular Sailor cadre according to their branches. It showed that the VNF and VNR branches, which do not directly contribute to the SLN military role, make up 1/4 of the SLN cadre. It is once again evident that just a very small portion of the larger sailor population is devoted to the SLN primary mission of ships and craft, with the remainder dispersed among the island shore bases. Additionally, some crucial branches, such as the Engineering and Electrical/Electronic branches, might be enlarged to meet the technological needs that result from SLN core competencies.



**Figure 7:** Breakdown of Present Sailor Cadre in SLN as at 2021.  
**Source:** Director Naval Personnel, SLN.



**Figure 8:** Breakdown of Regular Sailor Cadre as per Branches as at 2021.  
**Source:** Director Naval Personnel, SLN.

32. Additionally, SLN would be able to decrease its cadre in the future, given the current high rate of evaporation as well as low rate of inflow because it has concentrated on its key skills. In order to retain a certain number of naval personnel for

its core competencies and restricted non-core competency duties, the SLN cadre should be reduced.

33. **Training.** The training of naval personnel, including officers and sailors, is one of the important areas where SLN focuses much of its attention. These courses range from foundational to advanced instruction in a number of trades, as well as local and international training. However, it has been noted that the majority of officer training is delivered in English, whereas sailor training is delivered in Sinhala. Additionally, sailors in the SLN utilize Sinhala as their working language for daily administrative tasks while officers use English. When orders and information are sent from officials to their subordinates, this has frequently led to misunderstandings and poor communication. Accordingly, at SLN training institutes, the training of sailors seems fewer English-oriented and its cause to generate poor communication in between international forums and this may be the high time to get converted to English medium training for sailors.

34. Due large expansion of the new sea going capabilities the future will be to replace certain systems and machinery from the current fleet with more contemporary systems and equipment. The SLN must train its sailors in technological disciplines in order to maintain these systems. As a result, training facilities' infrastructure needs to advance. Furthermore, it is observed that initial recruiting criteria allows candidates with low education level are join with armed forces even without possessed with GCE O/L, this is making difficulties when train the recruits up to expected standards and required competencies. Therefore, the minimum requirement for enlisting sailors needs to be reconsidered. This will support the SLN efforts to shape its younger generation into a more dynamic maritime environment in the future.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

35. With special emphasis on the above facts and action plan discussed in this study, the following recommendations are derived by researchers:-

- a. As per prevailing economic situation in the country, it is most unlikely to be materialized the rest of the projection of requirement before year 2025.

Hence it is prudent to refine the ships requirement by reducing 02 FMV and including 02 Tanker ships and 02 multipurpose tugs which can be easily build in Colombo Dockyard PLC within next five years (2025-2030) in order to enhance the endurance of available AOPV/OPV and to react maritime disasters in effective way.

b. It is high time to change the training strategy of SLN to introduce a new methodology, technology to train the officers and sailors to suit with present context.

c. It is recommended to rearrange the SLN human force/factor within naval branches in such a way that the human resources are allocated rationally based on each branch task allocated.

d. In order to maintain the sustainability, following actions can be taken:-

(1) Expedite of floating dock project.

(2) Extending of docking/Routine Under Water Maintenance Repairs period subject to hull and machinery performance test.

(3) Using of ships staff of non-operational ships/crafts mixing with sea going staff in order to improve professionalism and reduce extensive use of same staff continuously.

(4) Wisely and sparingly usage of available assets for effective utilization.

e. It is recommended to utilize the funds received from the General Treasury effectively and efficiently. Further, the budgetary management system should be restructured in SLN Fleet up to 2030 to acquire new platforms for SLN to increase its surveillance capability and ability to deploy and berthing facilities in Colombo, Trincomalee and KKS harbour.

f. It is recommended to utilize newly acquiring platforms for effective maritime patrolling in EEZ and SAR region of Sri Lanka combining with the available capital ships of the SLN fleet.

g. The training of sailors should be more English-oriented and progressively transition to a totally English medium. The same is to be used in the interim at all SLN administrative levels.

h. The minimum requirement for enlisting sailors should be raised to a minimum level of GCE O/L. This will support the SLN efforts to shape its younger generation into a more dynamic maritime environment in the future.

### **CONCLUSION**

36. This study was carried out with the intention of evaluating the period of post war era, from 2009 to today, and understand the role of SLN in peace time as derived in the Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka, as well as, identify the objectives of SLN which have been mentioned in the Sri Lanka Navy's Maritime Strategy 2025.

37. In addition, It was identified the significant role and responsibility of SLN as a fighting power, in order to achieve national security and interest. In this paper, the researchers tried to compare and contrast, the physical component of fighting power, with the SLN peace time role and objectives.

38. And finally, it is identified what are the objectives already achieved and the objectives which were not achieved with the predetermined time frame as per SLNMS 2025. Then, critically analyze the unaccomplished objectives and forwarded several recommendations. Similarly, it was suggested some recommendations for further progression and development for achieved objectives as well.

## **References**

ENA, E. D., 2022. *Non Op FAC at ENA due to unavailability of MOH packages*, s.l.: Engineering Department ENA.

Engineering, D. H., 2022. *Docking over due ships- 2022*, s.l.: Director Hull Engineering.

Josheph, C. R., 2015. What should be the immediate objectives the SLN should aim to achieve in respect of maritime security and economic progress?. *Sri Lanka Navy Journal* , Issue 2015, pp. 148-157.

Navy, B., 2017. *British Maritimen Doctrine, Joint Doctrine publication*. s.l.:DCDC.

Navy, S. L., 2020. *Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka (MDSL- BR 1)*. s.l.:Sri Lanka Navy.

Navy, S. L., 2020. *Sri Lanka Navy's Maaritime Starategy (SLNMS)- 2025*. s.l.:Sri Lanka Navy.

Personel, D. N., 2021. *Sailor cadre in SLN - 2021*, s.l.: Director Naval Personel.



## SESSION TWO

**Ms. Sinduja Jayaratne,**  
Senior Lecture, Faculty of Strategic Studies  
(Kotelawala Defence University)



### **Introduction**

1. According Barry Buzan, a Professor from London School of Economics and Political Science once stated that security is “the pursuit of freedom from threat [that] in the context of the international system ... is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. Within such context, countries attempt to maintain national integrity through sovereignty<sup>1</sup>. For an example even if there has been any less significant improvements or exciting game changes mentioned in the National Security Strategy of Biden Administration, which was released in October 2022 by the White House, it emphasizes that America’s national security strategy is embedded in their national interests: “to protect the security of the American people; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.”<sup>2</sup> This showcases that America’s national interest acts as the vital „mean“ of achieving National Security „ends“. Therefore, national interest plays a major role in defining „means to the end“ in the contemporary national security atmosphere. As a result the national security strategy has been articulated in United States of America to protect the people and the sovereignty of the country based on democratic values. While taking these attributes of notational security into account *this paper emphasis the importance of national security strategy in post war Sri Lanka by looking at the changing dynamics of terrorism affecting to Sri Lanka.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century” *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991), pp.432-433.

<sup>2</sup> *The White House* . (2022, 10). Retrieved 10 16, 2022, from Content : <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

## **What is National Security Strategy?**

2. Before enlightening on national security strategy, it is important to understand the relationship between national security and strategy. According to Harold Laswell national security means "The distinctive meaning of national security means freedom from foreign dictation."<sup>3</sup> Besides, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explains national security as "the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders."<sup>4</sup> Both these definitions highlight the maintenance of national integrity and sovereignty while preserving a justified political and constitutional system in the country as national security. It is also important to understand how national security is achieved or preserved.

3. According to Carl von Clausewitz „strategy“ is defined as “the use of the engagement to attain the object of war.”<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, Liddell Hart has criticized the limitation of Clausewitz’s definition of strategy and has explained the concept as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”<sup>6</sup> However, both the definitions express the idea of achieving a political objective through various means even if the level of the political objective and applied means differs in scale. As a result, combining national security and strategy together, one can claim National Security Strategy as means of achieving or preserving national integrity and sovereignty of a nation-state. Hence, it is important to comprehend the national security atmosphere in post war Sri Lanka and means of achieving the objectives.

## **End of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**

4. The negative consequences of the Sinhala Only Act in 1956 and the Republican Constitution of 1972, appeared in 1976 when the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) claimed for a separate Tamil State within the boundaries of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

---

<sup>3</sup> Romm, J.J. (1993). *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

<sup>4</sup> Brown, H. (1983). *Thinking About National Security*. Boulder : Westview Press.

<sup>5</sup> Miyata, F. (2021). *The Grand Strategy of Carl Von Clausewitz*. [online] War Room - U.S. Army War College. Available at: <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/grand-strategy-clausewitz/>.

<sup>6</sup> ibid

Besides, the election which took place in 1977 added more flames to the burning separatist initiatives. The newly formed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) killed thirteen Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldiers on 23rd July 1983 which became the turning point of the ethnic riots which happened in the same year in Sri Lanka. Nearly 400-3,000 Tamils were slaughtered while most of the educated and rich Tamils fled to different countries as refugees drawing Sri Lanka into the mayhem of three decade ethnic conflict (Hashim, 2013, p.3).

5. In 2005 SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) Leader-Mahinda Rajapaksa came into power with his *Mahinda Chinthana* dictum „Prepare for war even as you negotiate“. However, even before the elections in 2005 with past experiences with round table talks, he was convinced that the LTTE would not lay down its arms through negotiations if not for military means. Therefore, soon after when he came to power he made changes within the „structure of command“ in the Sri Lankan Military. Not only that, the National Security Strategy focused on prioritizing the elimination of the LTTE and counter terrorism was based on enemy centric approach.

6. Sri Lankan Military understood that in order to contain the Tamil Tigers they needed to clearly identify the „centres of gravity“ of the LTTE which were the “hub(s) of all power and movement, on which everything else depend(ed).” (Clausewitz, 1984, p.595) Not only they identified the „centres of gravity“ of the LTTE, but also they had a proper framework to cripple those focal points. As a result of proper strategic and operational planning there was a massive reform within the Sri Lankan Military training structure. Apart from Special Task Force (STF) and Commando Unit, Special Infantry Operational Teams (SIOT) was introduced to the other units of the Sri Lankan Army during Eelam War IV.<sup>7</sup> Apart from that, the counter strategies became rigorous through the strengthening of „chain of command“, which became more ‘centralized, authoritative and hierarchical‘ enabling the responsible persons to make rapid decisions. The executions of those decisions became decisive, quick and well-coordinated marking the victory of the Sri Lankan government with the executing the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran on 18<sup>th</sup> of May 2009.

---

<sup>7</sup> SIOT was not a new concept which was adopted by the military only during Eelam War IV. In fact it was introduced to the Sri Lankan army by General Sarath Fonseka in 2002 and was sent to the basic commando endurance courses.

## **Changing Dynamics Terrorism and National Security Priorities**

7. After the thirty years of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the country was expected to flourish with thriving economic growth without any disturbance from violent extremism. However, the anti-Muslim riots in 2014, 2018 and the Easter Sunday attacks in post-war Sri Lanka highlight that the country is now experiencing an altered form of violence to separatism and, it has pushed the diverse societies towards ethno-religious polarization. Meanwhile, materials like „Voice of Hind“ which started to propagate the ideologies of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in February 2020, has encouraged potential Muslim individuals who spend their time mostly in social media, to embrace violent extremism as a means to their goals, especially in South Asia (Webber, 2022).

8. Learning from past experiences, organizations such as ISIS, have changed their modus operandi to articulate „regional hubs“ while making the Islamist extremists mutually inclusive through continuous propaganda and recruitment in these regions. Therefore, online propaganda mechanisms such as „Voice of Hind“, Green Bird Telegram Channel, Amaraq Media Center etc. constantly provide the necessary ideological support to gather scattered Islamist extremists to function through regional cooperation under specific regional coordination and leadership. Also, the re-emergence of ethno-religious movements and the nationalistic ideologies have contradicted with the Muslim presence in countries like India and Sri Lanka. As a result, “Islamophobia” in countries with multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations have depicted development of “reciprocal radicalization” (Jayaratne, 2020).

9. This situation has now been capitalized by regional ISIS elements such as Junudul Khilafah al-Hind to encourage like-minded extremists even during the pandemic situation. Also, the rapidly spreading anti-Muslim sentiments has reciprocated with a fear psychosis in the Muslim community which has made more and more radicalized elements not only in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, but also around the world due to the sense of power and unity in the concept of “ummah”. Therefore, the role played by propaganda mechanisms of the peripheral (international) Islamist extreme organizations have a tendency to influence like-minded individuals in the core (local context) due to created fault lines. Occurrence of the Easter Sunday attack is an example for such core-periphery relationship of Islamist extremism which has been ignited through propaganda disseminated by the ISIS irrespective of the validity of them.

10. On the other hand, the remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in overseas with the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora community are coercing the Sri Lankan government against “war crimes” committed during the 30 years of war, especially referring to Eelam war IV. Even if the allegations against Sri Lanka are baseless, the network of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora has achieved substantial recognition for their grievances from the international community. With the UNHRC resolution and recent bills in parliaments in Toronto and Ontario, depicts the success of the disinformation campaigns spearheaded by LTTE fronts such as Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), Global Tamil Forum (GTF), Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), British Tamil Forum (BTF) and Australian Tamil Congress (ATC). Furthermore, the propagation that there was a genocide in Sri Lanka, disseminated by LTTE front organizations distort the history of the country. However, threat of propagation by the LTTE front organizations in overseas, was seen as a peripheral threat mutually coincides with the events/perceptions co-occurring in the core.


11. For an example, The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam operates in many countries including the UK. The Prime Minister is Visvanathan Rudrakumaran who leads the organization from the US and the UK chapter is headed by Sokalingam Yogalingam. Visvanathan Rudrakumaran was the deputy of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), who was the chief of weapons and dual use technology procurement while handling the LTTE shipping Network. The TGTE has conducted several demonstrations in favor of the LTTE and separatism’s in the UK, especially in London. Sokalingam Yogalingam is actively lobbying British politicians and he is determined to get the LTTE removed from the list of organizations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 in Britain.

12. On December 10, 2018 five members of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam brought a legal case seeking to get the LTTE removed from the list of organizations proscribed in the Terrorism Act 2000 in Britain (Potter, 2021). The home secretary at the time decided that there was evidence that LTTE continued to be concerned in terrorism and refused the de-proscription application. The TGTE members then lodged an appeal with the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC), which was successful. On 21<sup>st</sup> October 2020 the POAC ruled the decision to proscribe LTTE as a terrorist organisation in the first place was “flawed”. On 18<sup>th</sup> February 2021 the POAC declined to order home secretary Priti Patel to lay an order in Parliament to remove LTTE from the list of proscribed organisations. Even if the effort of TGTE, was not successful in removing the LTTE from the

Terrorism Act 2000, this depicts the constant exertions made by the pro-LTTE front organizations in lobbying the favourable governments to their advantage.

**Gaps in National Security Strategy in Post War Sri Lanka**

13. Even if the repercussions have not yet ignited an arms conflict, the propagation has tarnished the image of Sri Lanka in the international community. It has now been evident that, the international community is exposed to a one-side story without having a counter narrative to the disinformation sprout by the LTTE front organizations. Also, the center of gravity of such false narratives have not been identified through a systematic process and therefore a strategic way forward to counter the threat of false propagation it is yet to be formulated. It is evident that the problem of propaganda has become inevitable to national security in two aspects. The Diagram 1.1 explains the information war which is unfolded by fronts against Sri Lanka in the present day.



*Diagram 1.1*

14. According to the Diagram 1.1 propaganda which is disseminated by Islamist extremists and LTTE front organizations in the periphery, simultaneously add to the radicalization process of two different minorities in Sri Lanka (Tamils and the Muslims). However, the nature of propagation and its effects are not the same due to its difference

in the ultimate goal of these two different fronts. LTTE front organizations are claiming for vengeance and for a separate state while the Islamist extremists call for a global jihad and creation of the Caliphate. Yet, both the propagations shake the foundation of peace and harmony in the Sri Lankan society due to the direct and indirect repercussions formulating from the radicalization of like-minded individuals who embrace such propagation.

15. However, the national security apparatus is in the process of fighting a „new war“ (propaganda war) with „old tactics“ (conventional approaches in warfare). There is a miscalculation of the center of gravity of the new opponent, and mostly the conventional counter strategies appear to be ad hoc than implementation of a systematic approach to fight against the new enemy. Diagram 1.2 explains the disparity of actual threat perception to counter measures which have been applied by the security apparatus in Sri Lanka in the post war context. Due to the gap of identifying Critical Vulnerabilities (CV), Critical Capabilities (CC) and Critical Requirements (CR) related to the new threat of information war mounting from two different fronts, the counter terrorism approaches have become stagnated and paralyzed in holding the continuous pressure of the new menace of disinformation.<sup>8</sup>



<sup>8</sup> Critical Vulnerabilities, Critical Capabilities and Critical Requirement are introduced by Jacob Barfoed in his article “A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles”. The three elements were first connected in describing Center of Gravity. Yet, the same concept can be utilized in discussing the articulation of national security Strategy. Critical Vulnerabilities in relation to national security can be identified as threats which shape the security atmosphere. Critical Capabilities are considered as existing capabilities to address the identified threats. Then, Critical Requirements are essentials which need to be improved to address the identified threats by calculating the gap between CV and CC.

## **CONCLUSION**

16. It is evident that Sri Lanka is exposed to two different fronts of propaganda war mounting from LTTE front organizations and Islamist extreme organizations. Sri Lanka is yet to identify non- kinetic approaches of terrorism such as disinformation and misinformation from above mentioned terror related organizations as a priority to national security. Therefore, counter measures related to terrorism in Sri Lanka mismatch with the actual threat which is related to propaganda war. As a result, National Security Strategy in post-war Sri Lanka is yet to see the importance of propaganda war counted from two fronts of terror related elements, as a Critical Vulnerability. Hence, National Security Strategy in post war Sri Lanka (related to terrorism) is still embedded in improving Critical Requirements which mismatch with the actual threat. Therefore, the Sri Lankan National Security Strategy is during the post war period needs to first, identify the importance of prioritizing the Critical Vulnerabilities as it is, and calculate the requirements whiling filling the gap of the exiting capabilities.

## **References**

Buzan, B. "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century" *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991), pp. 432-433.

Brown, H. (1983). *Thinking About National Security*. Boulder : Westview Press.

Clausewitz, C.V. (1984). *On War*. Translated by M. Howard. and Translated by P. Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.595.

Hashim, A.S. (2013). *When Counter-insurgency wins: Sri Lanka Defeat of the Tamil Tigers*.

Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, p.3.

Jayaratne, S.U.W. (2020). *Re-thinking the Sri Lankan Approach of Countering Islamist Violent Extremism*. In: 13th International Research Conference. Ratmalana: General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University.

Miyata, F. (2021). *The Grand Strategy of Carl Von Clausewitz*. [online] War Room - U.S. Army War College. Available at: <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/grand-strategy-clausewitz/>.

Potter, J. (2021). TGTE make submissions to the Home Secretary to lift the LTTE terrorism ban in the UK. [online] Bindmans. Available at: <https://www.bindmans.com/knowledge-hub/news/tgte-make-submissions-to-the-home-secretary-to-lift-the-ltte-terrorism-ban-in-the-uk/> [Accessed 16 Oct. 2022].

Romm, J.J. (1993). *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

The White House . (2022, 10). Retrieved 10 16, 2022, from Content : <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

Webber, L. (2022). Islamic State"s Voice of Hind Magazine: Globalizing the Regional Anti- Taliban Narrative. *Terrorism Monitor*, [online] 20(5). Available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-states-voice-of-hind-magazine-globalizing-the-regional-anti-taliban-narrative/> [Accessed 16 Oct. 2022].



**LUAWC Lansakara**  
Lieutenant Commander



**BMR Gunaratne**  
Lieutenant Commander (SBS)

### INTRODUCTION

1. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a sea of immense distances and incredible size covering 20% of earth which consists of a number of countries, oceanic territories, littoral states, major choke points, and it connects four continents. Further, IOR is home to various kinds of natural resources while being one of the busiest seas in trade among other oceans. The marine security within IOR is threatened by multiplicities of challenges, including traditional and non-traditional threats due to its significance.
2. Sri Lanka is situated in an exceptionally critical and advantageous position in the IOR and navy has to play a significant role in the preservation of maritime security dealing with a variety of challenges as mentioned above. Further, the challenges will be apparent in different forms in the future, mingling with more technical aspects. So, the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) needs to be ready in all aspects in order to handle both present and upcoming challenges to achieve the maritime security. The multiplicities of challenges, the role of navy could play in resolving these issues, and how the navy can be restructured to face future challenges will be discovered in this study.

## MULTIPLICITIES OF CHALLENGES

### Arrays of Challenges

3. The challenges take various forms. As far as challenges for SLN are concerned they expand through vast ranges depending on entrusted role and tasks to SLN. Being the country's first line of defense ensuring the maritime security is the major challenge in broader view. Under the broad category the future challenges for SLN can be categorized under the following criteria (Udugama D. 2019):-

- a. Non Traditional Threats.
- b. Emerging Threats.
- c. Sea Blindness.
- d. Economic and Technological Barriers.

4. The common features of these categories are they are not taking place in isolation, they have a wide range, and they are interrelated and interconnected to each other.

### Non Traditional Threats

5. The non-traditional categories of maritime threats are as follows;

- a. **Drug Trafficking and Gunrunning.** The famous world drug dealing regions of 'Golden Crescent' and the 'Golden Triangle' are situated in IOR and opened gateways to the arms and drug dealers. The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal are being extensively used by drug traffickers and reported cases are significant and alarming the security of IOR.
- b. **Maritime Piracy.** Since the region is strategically important as a route that links the East and the West, it has become a highly vulnerable place for piracy and threatens world maritime trade, especially in Somali waters and the Strait of Malacca.

- c. **Maritime Terrorism.** Non-state actors freely act due to weak coastal protection of the region. Attacks by Sea Tiger Wing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), attack of USS Cole by Al Qaeda in Yemen port in year 2000, terrorist struck on French oil tanker MV Limburg in the Gulf of Aden and the Mumbai attack in 2008 reemphasized the insecurity of the IOR.
- d. **Human Trafficking.** People try to escape frequently through the sea by fishing trawlers and the most common destination is Australia. Bilateral dialogues have taken place at very high levels between the countries to curb this trend.
- e. **Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing.** IUU includes all fishing that breaks fisheries laws and regulations and inadequate enforcement mechanisms allow uncontrolled IUU fishing in this vast area. (Dahanayake, 2018)

### **Emerging Threats**

- 6. Apart from the non-traditional threats followings can be identified as emerging threats:-
  - a. **Maritime Accidents.** The marine ecosystem is at risk due number of man-made maritime activities especially by ship accidents. Two major incidents reported in the recent past in Sri Lankan waters that were the New Diamond and the X-Press Pearl ship accidents are alarming us on the matter.
  - b. **Natural Disasters.** The IOR is sometimes called the 'World's Hazard Belt' as it is prone to disasters, like cyclones, earthquakes, Tsunamis, and tidal surges.
  - c. **Environmental Hazards.** Severe weather changes and the rising of sea temperature followed by sea level will adversely affect the natural cycles of the environment and its inhabitants in the IOR. (Vidanapathirana, 2017)
  - d. **Cyber Threats.** The cyber will eventually connect the entire world within a second and create a serious possibility, of a third party to hacking our own

systems and resulted loss of sensitive data. The Cyber threats for computer networks of maritime sector will be imminent in future.

e. **Geostrategic Competition**. China and India, two regional powers, have positioned themselves in Sri Lanka through a range of activities, creating a number of challenges in the geopolitical arena. (V.Manjula, 2019). The United States interest in the region also cannot be taken lightly.

### **Sea Blindness**

7. Josheph R (2017) has pointed out that Sri Lanka has various sea columns with various responsibilities, but does not have effective maritime surveillance capabilities and hence the Sea Blindness is a huge challenge;

a. **Search and Rescue Region**. Search and Rescue Region (SRR) under Sri Lanka, spans a vast sea area as 27 as its land mass and SLN is responsible to carry out SAR, and salvage operations for ships and cargo following maritime disasters out at sea.

b. **Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)**. Sri Lanka has an EEZ up to 200 Nm which is of seven times as its land area. The delineate the continental shelf claim made by Sri Lanka extending to possibly 350nm covering more than 24 times our total land area allowing Sri Lanka to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction power over issues related to maritime security.

c. **Long Coastline**. Sri Lanka has 1620 km length coastline and lack of assets and manpower of the navy has resulted in the creation of several blind zones around the coastline.


8. **Economic and Technological Challenges**. The nation's current economic situation will have a significant negative impact on the navy's ability to undergo a significant transformation by purchasing modern platforms integrated with high technology, expanding infrastructure and physical components, and enhancing the capabilities of existing assets. As a result, it causes a gap between expectations and

reality. Further, the SLN must be technologically compatible with other regional navies that are currently using sophisticated technology in order to be interoperable with them. However, in contrast to other regional navies, Sri Lanka takes considerable time to grow its navy to an acceptable level and thus always creates a gap between regional navies in terms of technology (Navy, 2020). If the nation keeps facing economic challenges for long period, the navy will have to face huge challenges in terms of expansion, sustainability, interoperability with counterparts and technological gap.

### **MULTIROLE NAVY**

#### **Maritime Security Matrix**

9. There is still no universal consensus on what maritime security actually entails. So, it is critical to understand how marine security connects to the numerous maritime challenges facing today. Professor Bueger C. (2015) has developed a framework called the ‘Maritime Security Matrix’ to identify how different variables might interrelate with maritime security under four main categories: national security, marine environment, economic development, and human security which are interrelated and interconnected.



**Figure 1:** Maritime Security Matrix

**Source:** Article Christian Bueger, Cardiff University

10. Figure depicts how, maritime security challenges such as terrorism, smuggling, IUU fishing, piracy, natural disasters, and accidents are scattered around the centre and how they are interrelated and interconnected to maritime security. On the other hand maritime related challenges affect to national security, environmental security, and economic security and human security. Bueger argues that national security, environment security and economic security and human security could effectively be achieved through sea power, marine safety, blue economy and resilience. In other words the maritime threats can be efficiently countered establishing sea power, marine safety, blue economy and resilience.

### **Naval Role in Maritime Security Matrix**

11. In this context Navy's role will be addressing the maritime security issues related to national security, marine environment, economic development, and human security through sea power, marine safety, blue economy, and resilience. Therefore, the Navy's future role will be multiple and challenging. So, regional navies are currently working to improve their three-dimensional marine capabilities to address challenges that fall under the maritime security matrix, and SLN will also need to play a multirole and tasks to ensure sea power, marine safety, blue economy, and resilience. The navy will not be the sole entity involved in all of these obligations, the other maritime-related agencies will need to play their own roles and perform their own duties to accomplish the ultimate goal together. In that sense, Sri Lanka Navy must have the ability to build up cooperation among the all stakeholders in the region. Addressing to four key factors highlighted in the maritime security matrix is the best strategy to accomplish maritime security while having a common working strategy for future challenges, a proactive approach, and interoperability with joint, multinational forces.

### **National Security through Sea Power**

12. National security refers to defense against dangers including terrorism, war, the spread of armaments, and espionage. In order to secure national security as a maritime nation, sea power must be established, and countering such threats is not easy to

undertake. Few areas that need to work on in order to accomplish national security are listed:-

- a. **Improve Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** Naval ships, the Coast Guard, coastal surveillance sensors, local intelligence services, the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, open-source web applications, human intelligence, and foreign intelligence are some of the main sources from which the information may be gathered. Additionally, SLN will have to collaborate and form alliances with other maritime fusion centers inside the IOR to boost the effort. Further, developing indigenous platforms, weapons sensors and systems is vital in order to modernize the navy to improve its surveillance capabilities along with operational capacity to counter any incoming threats refer to national security.
- b. **Employing Naval Aviation as Supportive Unit.** The airborne platforms will provide better swift long-range maritime surveillance compared to surface units. The modern sensors will make maritime surveillance easier and provide crucial information in maritime theatre. In the present day, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are ideal appliances for aerial reconnaissance with low cost with high operational flexibility. Further, SLN currently has capable helicopter landing platforms, with a few more to be added as per the SLN Maritime Strategy Plan in 2025. Therefore, it is important that SLN to initiate its effort to improve naval aviation capabilities to enhance its surveillance and operational abilities to counter threats referring to national security effectively.
- c. **Multirole Platforms.** As the future challenges are multiple, future naval platforms must be capable of handling a variety of challenges. Multirole ships are ranging from war fighting, ISR capabilities, anti-trafficking, external firefighting capabilities, oil spill response capabilities, disaster relief capabilities, and so on. Additionally, SLN will have to employ its resources and personnel in an effective and efficient manner despite arising economic constrain in future.
- d. **Asymmetric Warfare (AW).** SLN remains as one of the leading navies in the world which has pioneered the tactics and strategies of AW. SLN needs to

look through a different path in addressing the present and future expected maritime challenges through innovativeness in AW to fight threats referring to national security.

- e. **Encourage for Multinational Deployment.** SLN has to focus on regional deployment as well as take part in multinational deployment opportunities to conduct effective patrolling in collaboration and cooperation with other capable navies to counter maritime threats in very cooperative manner.

### **Economic Development through Blue Economy**

13. The navy will have to promote the blue economy, which is a sub-variable of the matrix's primary variable, economic development. Blue Economy is marine-based economic development that leads to improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risk and ecological scarcity. The role of the blue economy which aims at optimum and sustainable use of oceanic resources for growth and development of the nation. So, the Navy will have to solve specific issues related to following aspects listed below in order to ensure the concepts of blue economy, which will eventually result in restoring economic development:-

- a. IUU fishing.
- b. Protecting Oceanic Resources.
- c. Preservation of Bio- Security.
- d. Prevention of Marine Pollution.
- e. Establishing Energy Security along with renewable energy.

14. To overcome the aforementioned obstacles and create a blue economy, the navy must practice a number of strategies, as listed below;

- a. **Addressing to IUU Fishing Issue.** More Fishery Monitoring Points (FMP) need to be established at all major fishery harbours to monitor all inbound and outgoing fishing vessels while fleet units deploy out at sea to conduct patrolling, to prevent and apprehend both local and foreign fishing

vessels who engage with IUU fishing. In order to obtain greater collaborative participation on the issue, particularly in the case of Indian poaching, further diplomatic-level conversation is necessary. Moreover, constant coastal and maritime surveillance need to continue to monitor suspected movement, and activities of fishermen in order to address the issue.

b. **Formulate Appropriate Policies.** The national-level appropriate policy framework should be formulated to address the issues pertaining to the blue economy in the state. The overall economy of the IOR countries need to be devised a suitable accounting framework to measure the contribution of the blue economy in various aspect mentioned above.

c. **Improve Law Enforcement.** Law enforcement is one of the primary duties entrusted to the Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG) and SLN acts as a supportive unit for them to prevent illegal activities happening at the sea refer to the blue economy and navy must strict on that matters.

d. **Technology Development and Regional Cooperation.** Technology development and regional cooperation among the member states in IOR in sharing expertise in building energy infrastructure are important for rising production of renewable energy in the region. Further, there should be a regional mechanism to initiate deep-sea exploration and management of resources. So, the SLN also can involve in this regard as feasible through regional cooperation.

e. **Collaboration with Relevant Agenesis in Resolving Issues.** SLN will have to assist in the preservation and protection of maritime and marine environment by implementing and monitoring of measures required for the prevention and control of marine pollution and other disasters which occur at sea with the collaboration of outside organizations such as National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA), Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA), Coastal Conservation Department (CCD), SL Police, custom and wild life department. Further, navy can assist in the conservation of marine species by establishing and maintaining places like turtle hatcheries.

## **Environment Security through Marine Safety**

15. This section mostly addressed the challenges linked to maritime environmental aspects. Under this, navy must attain maritime safety, through several sub-indicators, listed below:-

- a. Marine Pollution.
- b. Climate Changes.
- c. Natural Phenomenal.
- d. Oil spill.

16. How the navy will handle these problems in the future?

a. **Marine Environment Protection.** Thought Marine environment protection is one of the key role bridges with Sri Lanka Coast Guard, still navy can indirectly support engaging with maritime environment protection in the following ways:-

- (1) Assist in the preservation and protection of the maritime and marine environment.
- (2) Assist the relevant authorities in the implementation and monitoring of measures required for the prevention and control of marine pollution and other disasters which occur at sea.
- (3) Assist in the conservation of marine species by implementing Turtle conservation sites around the Sri Lankan coastline.
- (4) Initiate plantation projects with the objective of cultivating trees that are suitable in coastal areas.
- (5) Assist in combating oil spills and participate in clean-up operations at sea and land with SLCG.
- (6) Conduct educational and awareness programs for naval and non-naval personnel.

- b. **Addressing Marine Natural Disasters.** Establishing current ocean monitoring systems, cross-strait surveillance systems and providing timely announcement of significant events such as disaster weather warning messages, oceanic pollution messages, piracy, basic meteorological information, water hydrological information, emergency rescue approach for oceanic activities, and maritime distress are very much imperative for addressing such threats.
  
- c. **Establishment of Strong Partnerships.** SLN needs to focus on establishing clear strategic, and external partnerships with capable nations to achieve broader maritime assistance through national collaboration to cater to any unexpected eventualities in the sea.

### **Human Security through Resilience**

17. Establishing human security is significant to attain Maritime Security. Numerous tragedies and accidents regularly happen at sea and resulted in the loss of precious lives. These issues are to be addressed through resilience, thus the navy will have to respond to them immediately and recover soon:-

- a. Accident.
- b. Human trafficking.
- c. SAR operations.
- d. Natural Disasters.

18. How can SLN deal with sudden and unanticipated challenges like accidents?

- a. **Conduct SAR Operation.** Large numbers of ships and multiday fishing vessels are operating IOR and high possibility to meet with an accident. Presently the SLN conducts SAR-related activities with optimum utilization of available resources and seeks expert knowledge and assets from friendly countries, and civil organizations. Further, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) links each country and shall require to establish a long-term and stable information-sharing platform to enhance regular communication and

collaboration in the future. Further, SLN currently has capable helicopter landing platforms, utilize them to conduct surveillance and SAR/HADR in an effective manner.

b. **Connect through Network Centric.** The integrated system will be a force multiplier thereby enhancing MDA capabilities allowing effective networked providing vital round the clock capabilities for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), SAR, pollution monitoring, and control and law enforcement at sea.

c. **Improve Operational Versatility.** SLN needs to improve its capabilities to contribute to all operations at sea, on land, in the air, and across required environments to respond any sudden emergencies like distress.

19. Maritime Security is attained as a result of the combined influence of all ground-level indicators that come under the four key components mentioned in the security matrix in figure 1 and the framework outlines the route and identifies key areas for improvement, attention, and address. In order to adequately handle upcoming challenges, the navy will have to greatly enhance its capabilities in future to become a multirole navy.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

20. SLN will have to face for many challenges in the future. In order to manage the challenges, country needs to establish strong diplomacy in parallel while acquiring the physical development of the SLN. So, to prepare the navy for upcoming challenges, identified areas to be developed are listed as recommendations below;

a. Recommended to keep the force ready and force to restructure to protect the interests of national security, and quick response to any challenge arise. The force and force structure of the Sri Lanka Navy must be restructured in parallel with future role and the SLN fleet also requires necessary change determined by the size, force, and power. Specially, SLN required to have cost effective, multirole platforms which are capable of performing multiple tasks.

- b. Recommended to enable network capability within navy. In this digital age, information and communication technology (ICT) is rapidly evolving. So, SLN must actively look for collaborative monitoring, information sharing, cross-border cooperation, and swift response in the digital world.
- c. Recommended improving maritime intelligence in order to have effective maritime domain awareness and requires the development and identification of the ways and means for collecting reliable information. Further, SLN needs to embrace emerging information and surveillance technologies and improve its expertise in using the information as a tool and a weapon.
- d. Recommended to establish effective maritime aerial surveillance. UAV is a smart machine used for aerial surveillance in the modern concept. This improves operational flexibility while lowering the significant cost associated with surveillance operations. It is crucial to develop the concept and gradually achieve the target level for aerial monitoring.
- e. Recommended to manage the defence budget and expenditure allocated for the navy effectively. The navy must carefully handle and allocate funds because all decisions, planning, and task execution are totally dependent on the defence budget. To get the Navy where it wishes to go, the military budget allocation should be carefully considered.
- f. Recommended to focus for effective and efficient navy. Efficiency is defined as the ability to accomplish something with the least amount of wasted time, money, and effort or competency in performance. Effectiveness is defined as the degree to which something is successful in producing the desired result; success. But, assets and manpower will be limited due to economic constrain in future trends. So future navy will have to exercise these two concepts with consciousness to accomplish future challenges.
- g. Recommended to change the navy's perspective. It is required the transformation from a buyer's navy to a builder's navy with the use of maximum support of naval manpower.

h. Recommended doing the right expansion at right time.SLN needs to expand in a timely and sufficient manner to fulfill its commitments and thereby be able to conduct the broad range of maritime defence and security tasking mandated by government policy.

j. Recommended standing with decisive leadership. Develop and sustain a leadership climate that encourages, initiative, decisiveness, and trust while improving SLN's future leaders' abilities to lead and manage effectively.

### **CONCLUSION**

21. Sri Lanka is situated in an exceptionally critical and physically advantageous position in IOR and it is a door opener for many maritime challenges especially for the navy. Further, the present day challenges will be apparent in different forms in the future and should be treated seriously. Therefore, the Sri Lanka navy needs to be ready in all aspects in order to properly handle both present and upcoming challenges. Further, Maritime Security matrix introduced by Professor Christian Bueger and his framework will support identifying, addressing, and analysing the challenges to attain the maritime security in an effective way. This study deeply explained the challenges the Sri Lankan navy is currently facing as well as those it will face in the future, the role the navy plays in resolving these issues, and how the navy can be modified to handle all the challenges in a more efficient manner in the future.

## **References**

Bueger, C., 2015. What is Maritime Security?. *What is Maritime Security?*, p. 11.

Capt(C) Dammika Udugama, C. (. S. K., 2019. Maritime Challenges in the IOR and Mitigation Strategies-Sri Lankan Perspective.

Dahanayake, c. N., 2018. IUU fishing in Palk Strait:Challenges to Sri Lanka navy and way forward.

Navy, S. L., 2020. *MDSL*. s.l.:SLN.

Premarathna, P. I., 2021. Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean:. *Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean;*, p. 16.

V.Manjula, L. (., 2019. Power Rivalry in the Inod Pacific Region.

Vidanapathirana, L. M., 2017. New Challenges Dynamics od Indian Ocean Region- In Relation to Economic and Social Issues.



## SESSION THREE



**IDMSM Thennakoon,**  
Lieutenant Commander



**SADTC Senanayake**  
Flight Lieutenant

### INTRODUCTION

1. The combat efficiency of a fighting force is a sum total of its tangible and intangible attributes. A well formulated tactics, under the broad umbrella of maritime strategy is key to a combat ready and effective Sri Lanka Navy (SLN). The tangible elements of the SLN include the manpower and the assets – both ashore and afloat. From 1958 to 1960 SLN acquired its first set of ocean going ships which was followed by a decade of establishing shore establishments. Royal Ceylon Navy grew into the present day SLN acquiring a number of ships and commensurately increasing manpower.

2. Embroiled in the protracted conflict with LTTE, the force structuring was primarily threat based and was instrumental in ensuring victory in 2009. Over the subsequent decades non-traditional threats eclipsed the traditional threats, affecting the economy and security of this beautiful island nation. Amidst the dwindling resources and receding economy the SLN can never afford to let the guard down. Question now arises – is the present force structure of SLN sharp enough to face the present and future challenges in the IOR? The succeeding paragraphs aim to find an answer to this.


## AIM

3. To analyse effectiveness of present force structure of SLN and forward recommendations for a sharper force structure aligned with the future maritime challenges.

### PRESENT STRUCTURE OF SLN

#### Manpower


4. With a very modest beginning in 1950, Navy comprised a total of 48 officer and 510 sailors, growing very rapidly over the years. With the rise of the LTTE, threat at land was greater than at sea. Therefore a large number of naval personnel were deployed in land duties. Later when the Sea Tiger wing started supporting the war at sea, the sea going complement was also increased to balance loss of life in combat. Growth of manpower is shown in the graph below:-



**Graph 1:** SLN Compliment Development


**Source:** Maritime doctrine of SLN

5. Thirteen years post defeat of LTTE the present strength of SLN is 48127 including 3259 officers and 44868 sailors. But today only 355 Officers and 4239 sailors, which is 9.5% of total strength, serve at sea. The breakdown is as follows:-



**Graph 2: SLN Compliment**

**Source:** Directorate of personal SLN



**Graph 3: SLN Compliment as Percentage**

**Source:** Directorate of personal SLN

## Assets

6. Like all other navies the SLN comprises land based and sea based assets. However, in variance, SLN at present is more land oriented than sea oriented. A brief on the assets is as enumerated.

7. **Ships**. The initial steps in transition to Blue Water Navy started with the acquisition of ships from England and Canada. This was followed by a number of acquisitions from China, USSR, US, Israel and India. However the most significant of acquisitions was the construction of Jayesagara and Sagarwardena by Colombo dockyard. The present day organisation of ships of SLN are as follows:-

- a. **Offshore Patrol Vessels**. The Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) are the largest warships deployed in the high seas to carry out surveillance and interception of illegal arms smuggling and to monitor naval activity within the EEZ.
- b. **Fast Missile Vessels**. The Fast Missile Vessels (FMV) were added to the Sri Lanka Navy in 2001 when two Israeli Saar 4 class missile boats were acquired.
- c. **Fast Gun Boats**. Fast Gun Boats (FGB) carry out multi-role missions from coastal patrols to shore bombardment in support of amphibious operations.
- d. **Patrol Boats**. Bay-class patrol boats are small craft utilised by the fleet to intercept smuggling and other illegal trafficking.
- e. **Fast Attack Craft**. Fast Attack Craft (FAC) have proven to be the workhorse of the Sri Lanka Navy in combating asymmetric warfare of the Sea Tigers of the LTTE, in the coastal waters of Northern and Eastern parts of the island during the civil war.
- f. **Inshore Patrol Craft**. They are used for small boat operations, harbour defence and amphibious operations.

g. **Littoral Attack Craft.** These boats are manufactured by the SLN's own boatyard and used by the elite Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and the Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS) for small boat operations.

h. **Amphibious Support Vessels.** SLNS Shakthi, indigenously built Landing Craft Utility and one Landing Craft Air Cushion A 543 form this group.

8. **Shore Establishments.** The island has been demarcated in to seven naval areas and 45 commissioned bases and other establishments. A large portion of the strength other than offices and sailors attached to the fleet, SLCG, special duties and local and foreign training is attached to those bases and establishments for duties. The details of commissioned bases and other establishments are as follows:-

<b>Deployment</b>	<b>NNA</b>	<b>ENA</b>	<b>NCC</b>	<b>NWNA</b>	<b>WNA</b>	<b>SNA</b>	<b>SENA</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Commissioned base</b>	7	14	6	4	8	4	2	<b>45</b>
<b>Naval deployment</b>	1			1	1			<b>3</b>
<b>NGH (CBO)</b>					1			<b>1</b>
<b>Squadron</b>		1		1				<b>2</b>
<b>Naval sub unit</b>				6	14	3	1	<b>24</b>
<b>Naval detachment</b>	13	33	29	33	1	7	5	<b>121</b>
<b>COP point</b>	73	55	111	74	5		1	<b>319</b>
<b>Sectors</b>					6	4		<b>10</b>
<b>Radar point</b>	22	20	17	14	5	11	5	<b>94</b>
<b>Total deployment</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>619</b>

**Table 1:** Details of shore bases

**Source:** SLN Director Naval Personal

9. **Sri Lanka Coast Guard.** SLCG functions under the Ministry of Defence at present and it is a law enforcement agency at sea. SLCG has deployed its fleet units and established shore bases, CG stations, CG substations covering whole coastal belt, the territorial waters

and maritime zones of Sri Lanka. The manpower requirement of the SLCG is given by SLN and the present strength of the SLCG is 105 officers and 1365 sailors - 3 % of SLN total strength has been attached to SLCG for its functioning.

10. **Secondment Attachments.** As per Naha 5 memorandums dated 14<sup>th</sup> April 2018 a large number of naval personnel are assigned for secondary attachments in over 30 duties.

11. **Pros and Cons of Present Cadre.** There are both advantages and disadvantages of maintaining considerably large cadre for SLN as mentioned bellow:-

<b>Pros</b>	<b>Cons (Dis)</b>
Enough work force is available to face any emergency situation such as Covid-19 pandemic	Command and control and administration are complex
Personnel can be spared for many constabulary roles and development programs.	High maintain cost (salary/uniform)
Reduce unemployment with in youth population.	Less expenditure on research and development
Reduce poverty of the country/ rural area.	Less expenditure for unit and system upgrade and expansion of fleet


**Table 2:** Pros and Cons of Present Cadre.

**Source:** Originated by Author.

## **FACTORS IMPACTING FORCE STRUCTURE**

### **Budget Allocation for Naval Projects**

12. After independence in 1948, the security environment was challenged by a host of potential dangers. The graph below depicts the fluctuation in defence budget allocation across the years:-



**Graph 4: Military Expenditure over Last 10 Years**

Source: Tradingeconomics.com

13. **Expenditure of SLN.** The following table shows the breakdown of capital vs recurrent expenditure of SLN:-

Sr.No	Year	Capital Expenditure (LKR)	Recurrent Expenditure (LKR)	Total Expenditure (LKR)
a.	2019	5,764,332,000	50,612,136,000	56,376,468,000
b.	2020	4,739,150,000	51,639,655,000	56,378,805,000
c.	2021	7,718,620,000	53,832,600,000	61,551,220,000
d.	2022	6,059,940,000	58,243,315,000	64,303,255,000

**Table 3: Summary of Total Expenditure of SLN**

Source: SL Budget estimates 2019-2021

14. In comparison to government employees, nearly 50 per cent of all personal emoluments go to the military, which is a significant amount. Amount spend on pensions alone is as depicted:-

Sr.No	Year	Amount (LKR)
a.	2019	37,580,689,000
b.	2020	38,887,230,000
c.	2021	39,916,400,000
d.	2022	41,615,000,000

**Table 4:** Emolument of Naval Personal

**Source:** SL Budget estimates 2021 / Tradingeconomics.com

### **Defence Budget and Expenditure**


15. A comparison of defence expenditure with the groups of similar states indicates that Sri Lanka's expenditure is higher (Alphonsus, 2021), compared as below:-

<b>Defence Spending, % of Central Government Expenditure</b>	
Similar Population	5.79
Post-Conflict	7.93
Lower Middle Income	8.50
South Asia	9.80
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>11.00</b>
Fragile and Conflict Affected States	11.20

**Table 5:** Defence Spending

**Source:** SIPRI, World Bank and Uppsala Conflict Data Program


16. Sri Lanka's post war defence budget exceeds its wartime budget in absolute numbers and yet the military capability is below the level predicted for its level of spending compared to its Asian peers (Alphonsus, 2021).



**Graph 5:** Efficiency on Defence Spending In Asia


**Source:** Defence spending and military capability data from Asia Index, Lowy Institute, 2018

17. According to the Jane’s assessments, Sri Lanka’s capabilities in amphibious operations, artillery and armour are more than adequate, yet unnecessary. The poor command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), air-defence and surface fleets are should be major concern. Further, it is observed that Sri Lanka’s capabilities are focussed on the land-domain rather than the maritime domain, which makes little sense for an island nation (Alphonsus, 2021).




**Figure 1:** The assessment of SL capabilities against perceived requirement  
**Source:** Jane’s Security Sentinel 2018

18. Sri Lanka spends too much on manpower, over-prioritises the army and under-prioritises diplomacy, policing and maritime capabilities (Navy). Southeast Asian and South Asian regions spend over half their defence budgets on personnel. Sri Lanka is 10-percentage points higher than that average.




**Graph 6:** Spending on Manpower  
**Source:** Jane’s Defence Budgets

19. Sri Lanka’s active-duty troop numbers higher than the island, IORA and world averages. In fact, Sri Lanka’s Navy has 48,000 sailors, while the Indian Navy, a country whose population is 64 times greater, has a naval strength of 67,228. The result of spending so much on manpower has led to unusually low spending on procurement, research and development as well as testing and evaluation. (Alphonsus, 2021).



**Graph 7:** Active Troop numbers  
**Source:** IISS Military Balance 2018 and author’s categorisations



**Graph 8: Active and Reserve Troops**  
**Source: IISS Military Balance 2018**

**Spectrum of Threats**

20. The nature of non-military, transitional and asymmetric threats in the maritime domain has changed significantly as a result of modern terrorism and transnational crimes across borders. The collective and regional working strategy, proactive approach and interoperability with joint, multinational, multi- agency forces will be critically important to a small island nation like Sri Lanka (SLN, 2020).

**Impact of Technology**

21. Today's requirements include use of technology, shift toward systems, automation, the use of drones for internal security surveillance, AI etc, Advantages are as follows:-

- a. Use of technology will help to reduce operational costs, but initially capital costs will be a bit high. However, in the long run it'll be more effective. For example, the installation of coastal surveillance radar can reduce the number of patrols.

- b. Use of artificial intelligence (AI) uplifts the ability for combat platforms to self-control, self-regulate, and self-actuate, using inherent computing and decision-making capabilities that would change planning concepts also.
- c. Automation and automated HR technology will reduce the operational and administrative costs.
- d. With the use of those technology-based systems, it is possible to reduce the number of platforms and make opportunities to downsize the number of naval personnel or adapt them to adapt to technology-enabled roles.

### **International Approaches**

22. The transformation of small navies must be carried out systematically with efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity. In hindsight, countries with high economic stability can focus on transforming their navies, whereas countries with slow economic growth must carefully balance their defence budgets and threat perceptions to achieve maritime objectives (Liyanagamage, 2018). A comparison with similar navies is enumerated in following paragraphs.

### **Royal New Zealand Navy**

23. New Zealand is an inherently maritime island nation with one of the largest EEZ. The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) has 11 major vessels and has set an exquisite “goal of being the best small nation navy in the world.” (Liyanagamage, 2018). Though small in size, the RNZN is capable of operating throughout the Asia-Pacific Region, including the Southern Ocean. With a comparable EEZ to Sri Lanka, RNZN is able to be effective by maintaining interoperability with like-minded regional nations. (Liyanagamage, 2018).

### **Republic of Singapore Navy**

24. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) is a powerful navy though small in size. (Liyanagamage, 2018). The RSN has a unique ability for force projection into distant waters, though limited in size, because of its fleet of submarines, and its deft use of technology,

human capital and diplomacy (Alphonsus, 2021). Along with security cooperation, partnerships with other maritime nations, technological advances, the RSN's ability to punch above its weight, through deft utilization of technology, human capital and diplomacy, as well as selective contributions to niche areas of multilateral security (Liyanagamage, 2018).

<b>Specifics</b>	<b>Singapore</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>Sri Lanka</b>
Population	5.54 million	4.69 million	20.2 million
GDP	USD 296.98 bn	USD 184.97 bn	USD 80.71 bn
Strength- Navy	4,500	2200	48000
Strength – Coast Guard	1000	2442	1470
Coastal area	193 km	15,134 km	1620 km
EEZ	1,067 km <sup>2</sup>	4,083,744 km <sup>2</sup>	510, 000 km <sup>2</sup>
Ships over Frigates	9	2	Nil
Ships below Frigates	19	9	12
Submarines	6	Nil	Nil
Maritime air arm	Nil	Nil	Nil
Helicopters	8	6	Nil

**Table 5:** Comparison of common features of Singapore and New Zealand navies/coast guards

**Source:** Future Maritime Security Concerns of the Sri Lanka Navy: Challenges versus Solutions, B Liyanagamage, 2018

## **FUTURE READY SLN**

### **Navy Force and Force Structure**

25. **Core Idea.** With a coastline of 1340 km, an EEZ of 200 nautical miles, and a maritime Search and Rescue Region (SAR) of 1,712,452 square km, limited ships in SLN have not been able to maintain an effective maritime surveillance. Therefore the need of the hour is to add more teeth and reduce the flabs. In terms of brown and green water operations, the SLN fleet of small ships and boats delivers quite a punch, but the ability to operate in blue waters over long ranges is a problem. (SLN, 2020). In terms of manpower, key focus will be to recruit, train and equip the right person for the right task in order to obtain effective and

efficient output with minimum economy of effort in line with the operational and administrative needs.

26. **Approach.** New approaches to include ships and aircraft may be able to expand potential and flexibility as connectivity and capabilities improve. The range of potential outcomes may broaden in the long run with systematic surface, air, underwater, cyber integration and electronic warfare capabilities. Therefore, SLN should decide which category of Navy force projection should focus in the future which address the future treats and economic restrictions. To prevent job duplication or overlap between distinct components, careful analysis is required. Utilizing resources wisely, both human and material is utmost importance when planning a force structure. Therefore, disintegration and integration may be necessary, allowing for reorganizing the force for an efficient and effective role.

27. **Management of Resources.** Therefore, for improved command and control, future naval forces should switch from independent operations to fleet combat networks comprised of integrated sensors. We need to include adaptability, capacity, and agility into our platforms and systems in order to take full advantage from new technology. The SLN also need to anticipate a future that will allow for joint operations. The administration of human resources will be a difficult task that requires careful consideration. To sustain main command and control, structures should be planned so that the system operates efficiently and without conflicts.

28. A few concepts summarise the above thoughts:-

a. **Form a Hybrid Navy.** The concept of combining smaller fleet units with the bigger vessels will give the SLN the ability to utilize our own small boats tactics to address present and future emerging maritime security issues with agility and flexibility. The separate squadron comprising frigates, OPVs, FGBs, FACs, arrow boats, and Inshore Patrol Craft will carry out joint operations to enhance the littoral water capabilities.

b. **Maritime Strategy 2025.** This is the master plan of the SLN to form 20 big ship fleet in 2025 with the acquisition of a minimum of two Frigates and Corvettes by year 2025. This will enhance the surveillance depth and reach new high and enhance blue water capabilities.

Ship	2016	2018	2020	2022	2025	Total
Frigates	--	01	--	01(02)	--	02
Corvettes	--	01	--	01(02)	--	02
OPVs	04	01(05)	01(06)	01(07)	01(08)	08
Fast Missile Vessels	02	01(03)	--	01(04)	--	04
Fast Patrol Boats	02	--	01(03)	--	01(04)	04
:	<b>Total</b>			<b>20</b>		

**Table 6:** The proposed 20-ship fleet of the SLN

**Source:** The SLN Maritime Strategy 2025

- c. **Establishment of Maritime Rescue Sub Centre (MRSC).** Expand the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre operations and enhance Search and Rescue capabilities of SLN through the establishment of MRSCs at Hambanthota and Trincomalee.

## **CONCLUSION**

29. Having analysed the existing structure in the backdrop of resources and challenges, it is evident that there is a need to chisel down the SLN. It is understood that such an activity cannot be undertaken in quick time but needs a deliberate planning and executive spanning over a decade. Maintaining 48000 cadres in peace time is not healthy for the nation, particularly due to present economic crisis. Tasking the SLN for only naval and essential non naval duties and expediting roadmap for new force structure by reducing the cadre will be the best possible solution. While it will decrease expenditure on maintenance, more money will be available for capability enhancement and capacity building.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

30. **Downsizing of Force.** Right size the SLN from 48,000 personnel to a manageable size considering the role of the SLN and the size of national budget due to financial and economic constrains. Few ways of achieving the means are as follows:-

- a. **Voluntary Retirement Scheme.** The services can offer a voluntary retirement scheme, which includes financial compensation and vocational training, plus a job offer in the construction and/or tourism sector.
- b. **Controlling Recruitment.** Reducing recruitment is likely to meet the least resistance from within the services as it does not affect the interests of those already in the service.
- c. **Maintaining Reserve Force.** Sri Lanka has the necessary legal and institutional structure in the form of the Volunteer Force. This can be expanded by offering active-duty personnel the option of switching into the reserves, potentially offering them incentives to join the reserves and matching them with vacancies in the private sector, especially construction, manufacturing and tourism.
- d. **Materiel Readiness.** Maintain materiel readiness to couple with reserves to provide support to customs and bio-security operations, HADR, and response to natural disasters with sufficient equipment.
- e. **Reducing AOR.**
  - (1) Hand over maximum land bases to the Sri Lanka Army and Coast Guard to carry out coastal protection.
  - (2) Base navy and naval operations from major bases such as Trincomalee, Colombo, Galle and KKS.
- f. Gradually reducing the number of volunteer, land-warfare, construction and maintenance oriented officers and sailors from SLN.

31. **Asset Augmentation.**
- a. Re-distribute freed-up budget to acquire new ships and equipment, research and development and indigenous productions.
  - b. Encourage innovation and indigenisation in the long run.
  - c. Prefer avenues of joint ship construction at local shipyards over foreign acquisitions.
32. **Establishment of Naval Air Arm.** While the SLAF is undertaking maritime missions for SLN there is a need to establish an integral air arm. This will increase the combat efficiency of ships. Meanwhile a joint doctrine needs to be developed to optimally exploit the recently acquired Dornier Aircraft from India.
33. **Separation of SLCG.** SLCG may be separated from SLN helping to reduce SLN cadre and both forces will be benefit in operational and administrative perspective.
34. **Undertaking Only Extremely Important Non-Naval Role.** The non-naval role and tasks that can only a Navy take up should only be performed by the SLN with its man power and other resources. The doubt/ issues between expenses and outcome of non-naval duties which can other civil department or private sector can effectively perform, should be identified and shifted away in order to reduce to effective utilization of naval man power for effective naval duties.
35. **Focus on Force Multipliers.** By focussing on a set of new or existing establishments, the SLN will be able to get the maximum output even by reducing manpower. Such essential/supporting establishments are:-
- a. CBRN unit.
  - b. Air observer, helicopter control and aviation unit.
  - c. Research and Development unit.
  - d. Hydrographic service.
  - e. Cyber security Cell.
  - f. Directorate of Naval Design unit.

g. Naval Boat Building Yard.

36. Pursue the Maritime Strategy 2025 and build a hybrid navy by combining the available large vessels, new acquisition of OPVs, and a flotilla of fast attack craft to improve operational capability.

37. **Unified Command**. Establish separate and unified operational command of all three services to master the key operational capabilities required to successfully execute the roles and tasks of littoral and deep sea operations. With an aim to plan and conduct joint operations, it shall help in reducing duplicity between forces.

### **References**

Alphonsus, D., 2021. Sri Lanka's Post-War Defence Budget: Over spending and Underprotection, Singapore: South Asian Scan.

Liyanagamage, B., 2018. FUTURE MARITIME SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE SRI LANKA NAVY. CHALLENGES VERSUS SOLUTIONS, Issue Naval postgraduate School, California.

SLN, 2020. Maritime Doctrine of Sri Lanka. Colombo: Naval Research Wing.

Pike, J., 2022. Sri Lanka Navy. [online] Globalsecurity.org. Available at: <<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sri-lanka/navy.htm>> [Accessed 13 October 2022].

Sri Lanka Navy, 2018. SECONDMENT ATTACHMENTS OF NAVAL PERSONNEL TO OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS. (Naha 5 memorandum)

Asian Development Bank, A. D. B, 2022. <http://www.adb.org/>. [Accessed 13 October 2022].

Central Bank Sri Lanka, C B S L, 2022, <http://www.cbsl.gov.lk>. [Accessed 13 October 2022].

**ERPK Udakumbura, RSP\*, USP, psc, MSc (D&SS)**  
Commander (G)



### **INTRODUCTION**

1. Naval warfare has evolved continually from the Battle of Salamis under the leadership of Themestical from 2500 years back through the Battle of Trafalgar under the able leadership of Admiral Horesies Nelson to the Battle of Midway in World War II under the leadership of Admiral Chester Nimitz. More than 2500 years of naval war fighting history, the legacy brought us that the success of every battle depends on the effective exploitation of selected ends, ways and means against the enemy.
2. All battles continued with the effective integration of knowledge to fight, will to fight and means to fight. The incorporation of three components- Fighting Power is an essential instrument for successful warfighting. The commander's intent is to position his force to take leverage against enemy forces at all-time yet his prime responsibility is to achieve the fighting power of his force before the fight. Even though the three component of fighting power is vital tools for warfighting, the professional mastery of fighting power is an important aspect of the achievement of the Commander's intention.
3. Professional mastery in war fighting can be achieved through various means. The equipment and concept to fight are good means to fight war however the history of more than 2500 years of naval warfighting brought up that the best means to fight a war is the men. The behavioural changes of men are important facts to the achievement of ends. The behaviour of men is mainly decided by three components: Skills and ability, Declarative Knowledge and Motivation. The first two components can be effectively imparted to men with effective, systematic and realistic training throughout their careers. The most important and difficult part is the last component Motivation. The

indication of motivation is more or less intangible and hard to measure. In addition, various reasons will affect the motivation factor of men.

4. Sri Lanka Navy is in a transition period from the aftermath of the Ealam war to a conventional and professional navy. Moreover, the political and economic situation in the country is not in a healthy situation for the way forward of the SLN. The financial restrictions severely confined most of the training and development activities and lead to a lack of developing motivational options toward the wellbeing of the men. At this juncture, various measure has to take to develop the motivation of the men. Thus, the effort that has been made to become a professional navy is somewhat challenging in the present situation. However, the window of opportunity is always available, if SLN is committed to finding the ways and means to nature its professional activities through the change of behaviour.

5. Against this backdrop, this article will discuss the component of fighting power and how we can achieve professional mastery. The conceptual idea of behavioural change and how best the behavioural changes should be developed particularly to motivation within the organization will be discussed. The conclusion and recommendations will be brought up to find a solution to improve motivation and finally lead to professional mastery of fighting power to become an effective navy.

### **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF FIGHTING POWER**

6. Fighting power is the result of the integration of three interdependent components: the intellectual component provides the knowledge to fight; the moral component provides the will to fight; the physical component provides the means to fight. The role of professional mastery in the integration of these components to generate fighting power (Soldiering, 2000). The intellectual and moral components of fighting power represent the human dimension of warfighting. They are concerned with how people, individually and collectively, apply their non-materiel resources—intellect, emotions, motivation and leadership—to fight and win. The capacity to apply these resources is a critically important element in the human dimension of warfighting. It is

what enables individuals and teams to succeed in a complex and chaotic battlespace characterized by danger, uncertainty and friction (LWD 1)

7. The physical component of fighting power is represented by the means to fight, training and human. The three components of fighting power are required to use effectively and wisely through professional mastery to achieve fighting power. Professional mastery is always achieved through the human resource. The way personnel uses the component of fighting power differs from each other and various reasons will affect the mastery.



**Source:** LWD1, <http://www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/vip-usa/UploadFiles/2008-05/chapter5.pdf>

## **DEVELOPING PROFESSIONAL MASTERY**

8. An individual's innate attributes include physical capacity, intellectual ability and moral values. These attributes can be enhanced over time by education, training and experience. Education is a whole-of-life process that develops higher-order cognitive skills through both structured and unstructured learning. Training, on the other hand, is the process of developing the specific vocational skills required to perform set tasks. Experience, or experiential learning, is fundamental to individual development. It involves the exercise of skills, knowledge and attitudes 'on the job' at all levels and, more broadly, in personal and public life. Experience helps to develop the deductive and inductive decision-making skills that are essential for exercising professional mastery(LWD 1)

9. The exercise of leadership, whether by an individual in a formal command position or as a member of a team, is the core activity that integrates the components of fighting power. For example, leaders demonstrate professional mastery through the translation of operational concepts into orders or suggestions that employ the physical element of fighting power to the best effect. Securing the willing cooperation of others in the execution of orders depends on those orders making sense morally as well as militarily(G. Sloan, 2012)

10. The major drawback is whether our personnel are ready to embark on or whether their behaviour is changed to achieve organization goals. The component of fighting power except for a few physical components, all are under the influence of the cognitive and skill domain of humans. Thus human behaviour directly influences the achievement of fighting power. The process of professional mastery, human behaviour make a considerable effect on all elements of fighting power. The blending of three components requires human behavioural factors as an ingredient to make the blend strong and sustainable.

## **IMPORTANCE OF BEHAVIOURAL CHANGES WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION**

11. Some of the most traditional questions applied psychology revolve around explaining why individuals differ on a specific performance dimension or why an individual's performance changes from time to time. But statements such as 'Training changed performance significantly', 'the situation affects performance', or 'ability determines performance' are not explanations so much as they are empirical correlations and thus do not speak to the casual mechanisms involved. It should be possible to provide a more casual explanation without regressing to a confrontation with the mind-body problem and the physiological determinants of behaviour.

12. The behaviour of naval personnel is a matter of the success of the SLN. Whether it is a positive, neutral or negative behaviour, the consequences will directly affect the performance of the organization. Rodney, Alex and John conducted research on the performance of the US Army for the US Army Research Institution for Behavioural and Social Science in 1994. They have defined performance as a behaviour or actions that are relevant to the goals of the organization. Further, they have indicated that performance is not the outcome, consequence, or result of behaviour or action, performance is the action itself. In addition, performance is multidimensional, such that for any specific job several substantive performance components are distinguishable in terms of their intercorrelations and patterns of covariation with other variables (Rodney, Campbell, Cudeck, 1994).

13. The researchers have brought up a formula where;

$$\text{Personnel Behaviour} = f(\text{SKM})$$

Where:

**S** = Skill and ability to perform a task

**K** = Knowledge of facts, rules, principles, and procedures (Declarative knowledge)

**M** = Motivation to perform (Rodney, Campbell, Cudeck, 1994).

14. The following diagram defines the correlation of above three determinants of the behaviour of the personnel;

$$\text{Personnel Behaviour} = f(S.K.M)$$

Where  
S – Skill & ability  
K – Declarative knowledge  
M – Motivation



15. Wanting to succeed isn't enough. Having the ability without the desire to train also isn't enough. The same thing is true in more traditional jobs. For an organization to succeed, it needs personnel who perform well. The organization needs to make sure the good personnel stays with the organization. If SLN can succeed at these things, the organization can then concentrate on building further knowledge and skills. And, finally, SLN need to find ways to motivate personnel to perform well on their jobs—to take their knowledge and abilities and apply them in ways that contribute to organizational performance. It is the prime responsibility of SLN to understand the function of Skill, Knowledge and Motivation in the behaviour of its personnel.

16. The skill and knowledge determinants are learned by every person joining the navy in different stages of his or her career progress as compulsory or optional training. Various examinations, competitions and opportunities are extended to develop

declarative knowledge of the naval personnel. The main issue is with the motivation determinant. Does SLN personnel motivate to change their behaviour? How much do they like to use their knowledge and skills for the betterment of the organization? This determinant is intangible and difficult to measure yet need to understand the most important among the three of them.

17. Motivation is a process of stimulating people to accomplish desired goals. It is mainly a product of training, confidence in equipment, leadership, management, reward, discipline and mutual respect. Motivation requires an understanding of both what is going on and what is required. Motivation and high morale (the will to fight and confidence in succeeding) are interdependent. Abraham Maslow once mentioned 'If the only tool you have is a hammer, you will see every problem as a nail'. The issues in human resources may have different reasons and may have various solutions as well. The ability of an organisation to maintain the human resources highly motivated and effective is largely dependent on providing opportunities to each individual to develop fully, to utilise his/her abilities to the full, and to find continuing job satisfaction. Development of human resources, therefore, has to be a persistent process and Continuous Professional Development (CPD) can be considered as a means to achieve the objective. (MDSL, 2020)

### **HOW SLN CAN DEVELOP DETERMINANTS OF PERSONNEL BEHAVIOUR TO ACHIEVE FIGHTING POWER**

18. The developing process of personnel behaviour is two way. The first one is that SLN should take the necessary initiatives to understand the present generation's behaviour, culture and aspiration to motivate them. There should be a centralized process covering all the naval areas required to be introduced as short-term and long-term goals. Second is the changes within the personnel. The naval personnel should understand the requirement of improving skills, ability, knowledge and motivation to become a successful naval person. The self-motivation within the individual is required to generate thinking in different ways.

19. Humans like to be respected and appreciated by others. A recruit sailor to a Master Chief Petty Officer and a Cadet to an Admiral expect due recognition for their work and dedication irrelevant of their rank or rate. If they feel that they are not respected by others they may sense that they no longer belong to the organisation and this psychological force will further drive them to be demotivated. The feeling of belongingness to the organisation is also an important motive force that will help personnel to direct for one goal.

20. The junior-most sailor who does sentry duty in the outer perimeter of a naval base should feel that he is protecting the entire base and if he has not performed duties the entire base will be in danger. In the same way, all the personnel inside the base should consider and recognize his duty and its importance in the sense of base security. Accordingly, all naval personnel likes to be recognized for their work by others as human beings. Officers in all ranks also like to see that their contribution to the organization is valued and recognized. The recognition of the work will improve the confidence of the Junior Officers and encourage them to attend more creative work in the future.

21. The Senior sailor of SLN is an important link in the Divisional System and mean to hold responsibilities in various capacity. However, at present, they are not fully empowered to carry responsibility and are equal to a junior sailor in duties and responsibilities. This effect severely influences the behaviour of senior sailors. They take this less responsibility and stay without giving effective support to decision-making authorities. The effective utilisation of senior sailors by empowering certain responsibilities will enhance their confidence and belongingness to the organisation.

22. As Julius Caesar once mentioned, 'Lack of knowledge, lacked confidence- Lack of confidence, lacked victory'. In the same way, SLN must continue to develop the professionalism of the naval personnel. Professional knowledge and sound training should be taken as the only method to survive in the navy. The naval personnel should feel that without professionalism, it is highly unlikely to sustain in the future navy. All naval personnel must understand 'training as a welfare'. The magnitude and rhythm of the training should be continued in all training establishments while introducing best practices of human resource management. However, facilities for the under trainees

should be developed. The Officer Under Trainees must be provided enhanced facilities of accommodation, food, etc. This would build pride and self-esteem in their minds. Moreover, this effort will enhance their motivation for career development and to achieve organisational goals.

23. At present, out of 2873 officer carders there are about 1000 regular Lieutenant Commanders in the navy. As a percentage, it is 34.8 percent. More than one-third of officers belong to this bracket and their seniority varies from 11 years to 22 years. In employment per se, they are the first level of senior officers and most of the time the 'working force'. In civil life, they are committed achieving some of the basic needs and esteem needs. They are seeking self-esteem as they fulfil the lower levels of needs. If these needs for self-esteem cannot be achieved, they will be in a desperate situation. These desperate officers will not think about self-actualization as they are not facilitated to achieve the needs of self-esteem.

24. Moreover, the strength of the Leading Rates of the navy as of 30 September 2022 is 19107 out of 44945 sailors and it represents 42.51 percent of the sailors' cadre. The percentage is near to half of the sailors of SLN and it's a huge number of employees when concerned with organizational development. They are in the service bracket of 5 to 15 years. These sailors are passing the age of 23 to 33 years of their lives, and most of the events of their life such as marriage, constructing a house, buying a vehicle, and having offspring are taking place. The navy should support this working force to achieve self-esteem. If the navy cannot support this process, these sailors will be elevated as senior sailors on one fine day in the future absence of achieving the basic needs of self-esteem. Thereby, the navy will create senior sailors who lack the self-esteem to achieve what is expected from their work.

25. The officers of the SLN carry lots of responsibilities of different magnitudes when climbing the ladder of their careers. The junior-most watchkeeping officer to Rear Admiral who command a naval area carries various responsibilities and accountabilities. The financial value of some of the assets commanded by SLN officers is huge while the strategic value of those assets is higher than the financial value. Contrary to the above, the SLN perhaps does not consider these aspects when it comes to trust its individuals. Some of the concepts and guidelines that are being issued to

regulate naval personnel's activities do not go with the responsibilities and trust held by the naval personnel.

26. Maslow's physiological needs indicates that good living condition is important to motivate personnel to rise to the next higher levels. SLN provides accommodation, food, and clothes for its personnel. However, it is high time to revisit the quality of these provisions. Small rooms which can be accommodated 4 people with a bathroom facility is an ideal concept and it would have helped to prevent the COVID-19 pandemic if we are practicing it in the navy. This effort will also improve the privacy of the personnel.

27. People work and earn money to ensure the security of their families. It may be food security, life security, financial security, medical security, wealth security, etc, the whole aim is to protect the family and loved ones. The most important concern for the naval person who works a hundred miles away from the loved one is the security of the family. In the absence of family security, the subject person will not be able to concentrate on his work. This could affect the entire organizational goals. We in the navy most of the time consider that the salary that naval personnel gets is 'the security factor' of their life. However, besides the salary, other aspects ensure the security of the family.

28. Every member of the SLN is committed to serve at sea and shore. The Navy is an environment that is stressful and tiring. On the other hand, it isolates individuals from family, friends, and many of the comforts and activities. It is important to ensure naval personnel's well-being and work-life balance. This balance is aided by the recognition of family commitments and the establishment of flexible working arrangements. A cycle of employment must be designed to ensure that every member has an opportunity to have a break from extended periods at sea, remote areas, or sustained operations. Flexible employment options contribute to improving morale, motivation, job satisfaction, and ultimately retention.

29. The effect of COVID-19 is unfavourably affecting the naval personnel. All restrictions imposed against naval personnel's day-to-day activities change the mindset of personnel that they need more amenities to come out from the psychological trauma. Thus, post-COVID-19 human resource development activities cannot be achieved by

restoring the previous system because the navy has to compensate for the damage that occurred to naval personnel's livelihood during the pandemic situation.

30. Skill and ability development is another important aspect. The Naval Fleet Command is committed to carry out Operational Sea Training as its flagship training event among various training activities to enhance skills and ability. These training are more specified to impart professional knowledge while improving skills. Realistic training is further required with more simulation training to cater to the practical aspect required and to motivate onboard sailors to understand the importance of realistic training. The other training programme conducted by NFC such as PCT, RCMAA, CONEX and International exercises in parallel with the main effort is also giving more positive responses in developing professional and confident personnel onboard.

31. All naval personnel must be aware that the importance of improving declarative knowledge among naval personnel. A few methods such as essay competitions, quiz competitions, public speaking and etc have been introduced to improve skills and reading habits to gain required declarative knowledge. Further improvement in these aspects is important as knowledge of facts, rules, principles, and procedures should be in the back of mind in the decision-making process. The motive force to develop and improve the Attitudes of naval personnel is important in this period as most of the organizational pull factors are handicapped due to the economic austerity of the country. The values, quality of life and pride of all naval personnel are to be inculcated through different ways and means from the initial training itself to reflect them while progressing in career prospects.

## CONCLUSION

32. Achieving fighting power through professional mastery is an important factor. As discussed professional mastery cannot be achieved just by implementing fighting power instead it requires strong bonding, blending and delivering mechanisms to mix elements of fighting power. Behavioural changes in personnel through the development of skill/ability, declarative knowledge and motivation will enhance professional mastery. Motivation is one of the crucial and predominant factors that does not have a readymade solution to develop. The deflated motivation will reflect in various outcomes and difficult to find remedies in a short time. Short and long-term plans are required to continue with motivated human resources.

33. The needs, security, and facilities of naval personnel will be key areas to cater to when managing the SLN human resource. Co-values and norms of the SLN are clear. However there is a question, "Is our human resource ready to follow these concepts?" It is the prime responsibility of any organization to shape and make ready its personnel to achieve the set goals. Sociological and psychological issues of personnel are more prone to change the motivation of naval personnel. The above human issues are required to mitigate as much possible as to maintain a healthy environment.

34. Quality and professional human resources are an asset to an organization. The well-structured training system of SLN is a good opportunity yet we need to analyze whether the naval personnel is ready to receive the knowledge the training curriculums expect. The training is not a one-way process, it's a two-way communication where the feedback of the end-user will confirm whether the trainee gained knowledge as expected or not. Therefore, the human factor of a training cycle is important to achieve the success of the organization. Accordingly, the behaviour of the personnel in a real working environment also affects the organizational goals. The behaviour of the new generation should be carefully understood and implement measures to take on track with the most suitable mechanism. This effort is not easy and required more compensation and consolations efforts in some other ways.

35. Obviously, the strategic and geographical importance of the island demands a strong and capable navy. The task which will be entrusted to SLN will be immense in the future. The acquisition of platforms and new technological equipment are only diplomatic and document processes subject to financial capacity. But the development of a human resource to support the above acquisitions are chiefly under SLN. Thus, all tangible and intangible requirements of personnel are required to oversee equally to develop capable and self-actualized naval personnel. Although the effects of demotivated human resources are invisible, they are popping up indirectly in numerous ways. Therefore, SLN is required to understand these effects in advance.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

36. Following recommendations are brought up:-

- a. Understanding of generation 'Y' and Millennia.
- b. All personnel's social needs are required to be met within the organization. Similarly, they should feel that their contribution to the organisation is valued. During the basic training, the conceptual framework of respect and value to others should be inculcated.
- c. Implementing of Total Reward Approach
- d. Special considerations such as non-financial benefits, career development programmes, welfare provisions, etc should be introduced to promote self-esteem.
- e. Leading Rates should be recognized as a special level compared to other junior sailors by giving more prominence such as separate accommodation, food, leading hands club, activities, and leading roles.
- f. After carefully studying the hearts and minds of personnel SLN can implement various activities to develop Self- esteem. This effort should be

centralized to avoid the ad-hock changes that could take place when new personnel takes up the respective positions.

g. Empower senior sailors to carry out most of the routine nature duties without supervising officers and take their assistance for the tactical level decision-making process of the naval bases and units.

h. SLN must revisit the family security of its personnel in numerous ways to prepare future human resources.

j. Training infrastructure such as simulators, training ships and etc are to be introduced to cater for the hindered onboard training due to financial issues.

## References

LWD 1 The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, How does the Army generate fighting power? Online available at: <http://www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/vip-usa/UploadFiles/2008-05/chapter5.pdf>. Accessed on 12 October 2022.

Soldiering - The military covenant: ADP Volume 5, 2000, online available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/395358/2000-ADPvol5\\_Soldiering\\_the\\_Military\\_Covenant\\_Ver2.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/395358/2000-ADPvol5_Soldiering_the_Military_Covenant_Ver2.pdf). Accessed on 12 October 2022.

G. Sloan, 2012, Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory. Online available at: [https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/riia/v88i2/f\\_0024615\\_20260.pdf](https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/riia/v88i2/f_0024615_20260.pdf). Accessed on 12 October 2022.

A.M Rodney, J.P Cambell, R. Cudeck, A Confirmatory Test of a Model of Performance Determinants, Journal of Applied Psychology · August 1994. Vol 79. N64, 493-505, Online available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232425335>. Accessed on 12 October 2022.

MDSL, 2020, online available at: <https://www.navy.lk/maritime-doctrine-of-sri-lanka.html>. Accessed on 12 October 2022.



**NAVAL & MARITIME ACADEMY**  
**NAVAL DOCYARD, TRINCOMALEE,**  
**SRI LANKA.**



**JUNIOR NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE**



ISBN 978-0-818-26030-0  
9 780618 260300