



**CONTRIBUTION OF
LOGISTICS
TO SUSTAIN FORCES
IN
FALKLANDS
WAR**



CAMPAIGN PRESENTATION

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INTRODUCTION

“Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war”

- Clausewitz.

1. The Falklands War was an effective state of war in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falklands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, whose ownership had long been disputed.

2. Countries including Argentina, Britain, France and Spain had claimed for the Falkland Islands from the eighteenth century. In 1833, the Great Britain has reasserted its claim of sovereignty of the islands, forcing Argentine administration to take their claim back. Since 1833 Falklands have internal self-governance, and the United Kingdom takes responsibility for their defence and foreign affairs. Stanley is the capital of islands. After the period of 150 years British rule, 1982 was the year it would once again be challenged.

3. In 1981 the new Conservative government of the Great Britain, led by Margaret Thatcher published its defence review. According to that, the British government had reduced her naval presence in the South Atlantic area, by withdrawing Britain’s only ship deployed in that area, HMS Endurance.

4. This action encouraged the Argentine administration belief that Britain’s interest in the Falkland Islands was waning. Argentina’s military junta, having been in power since 1976, was facing an economic crisis and civil unrest. To restore support and bolster national pride, it decided that winning back Islas Malvinas or the Falkland Islands was the answer.

5. Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri, ordered to invade the Falklands Islands on 2 April 1982. There were small garrison of about 80 British Royal Marines posted at the capital, Port Stanley. They were strengthened by 20 locals who managed to hold off the Argentine troops for two days. But with the arrival of 3,000 more Argentine troops to the island, Governor of the Falkland Islands’ Rex Hunt, ordered to the British troops to be surrendered. By 4th April 1982, Port Stanley was under Argentina’s control. The Great Britain severed all her diplomatic ties, prepared for an invasion and it assembled a large naval taskforce. It was headed by HMS Hermes

and HMS Invincible. Those were light-aircraft carriers designed for Sea Harrier and Sea King aircraft. They were vital in providing air cover for the fleet. They left Portsmouth on 5th April 1982 and took them over two weeks to voyage through 8,000 miles to reach the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean.

6. Although, the Argentine government, led by professional soldiers, they were having the thought of the seizure of the Falklands as a political act to obtain a diplomatic bargaining and not as an act of war. Indeed, the junta was in high level of confidence that the Great Britain would accept its action as a fate accompli and no plans or special preparations had been taken to repel a any possible reaction from British task force and defend the islands. However, with the powerful British task force being assembled and expected to arrive in three to four weeks, the Argentine armed forces had to cobble together a force and create a plan to defend the Falklands. It was to be a truly “come-as-you-are war”.

AIM

1. Aim of this presentation is to derive logistic strategies executed in Falklands war and to understand how best the logistics mechanism contributed in achieving mission objectives.

Geography and Historical Background

2. The Falklands consist of about 200 islets of various sizes, out of which East and West Falklands are the largest. These cover some 4700 square miles. Stanley, the capital is in the East Falkland and at the time of the war the total population was reported as 1200. Falkland Islands are 400 NM East of Argentine and 8000 miles South West of Britain and 3750 mile from Ascension Islands. The smaller Island of South Georgia lies 780 miles East of the Falklands as shown in Map 1.



Map 1 – Geographical situation

3. In 1690 Captain John Strong of UK, touched northern tip of the Islands. Strong named it after the first lord of the Admiralty as “Falkland”. In 1764 French after settling on Falklands transferred the Islands to Spain. Commodore John Buron sent by Admiralty hoisted the union jack in 1765. In 1790 according to the agreement British handed over it to Spain. Argentine after independence from Spain appointed its first governor in 1823. US Captain Lexington along with other ships invaded the island and declared the islands as “free of all governments” and sailed away. This event provided a chance to Admiralty for the appointing its first governor in 1833 and remained under British control till invasion by Argentine in 1982.

Opposing Claims

4. Both Argentine and British raised their claims for the sovereignty of the islands.
 - a. **Argentinean Claim.** The Argentine case rests on the argument that discovery alone has never been accepted by international lawyers as the foundation of sovereignty. Secondly, after the downfall of Spain these islands became the legitimate part of Argentine.
 - b. **British Claim.** Britain asserted a claim in 1765 and never re-announced it. Secondly, the continuous possession over a period of time constitutes a right of ownership. Third is the principle of self-determination based on the fact that islanders want to stay British.

Stance of United Nations

12. UN passed a resolution in 1964 which recommended that British and Argentine governments should peacefully resolve the dispute, keeping in mind wishes of the islanders. Falklanders conveyed to UN General Assembly that under all circumstances they wished to remain under British dependency. In December 1965 as per resolution 2065 UN again requested both nations for peaceful negotiations.

“When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you continue for a long time it will dull your forces and blunt you edge...If you keep your armies out in the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient. Transportation of provisions itself consumes 20 times the amount transported.”

-- Sun Tzu

13. The deliberate objective driven British Task Force was clearly demonstrated the contrastive talents in the field. The British were impressive in all quarters both in the war as well as in logistics than that of Argentines. Argentines concentrations on logistics were not in place

after a well plan. The military Juntas were focused mainly on the deployment of the troops but they never had a critical plan on the logistics may be due to miscalculation of possible threat would pose from British.

14. Because of the lethargic role played by Argentines in logistics the contribution for learning was insignificant. However the systematic approach in logistics arrangements by British toward mission was surprisingly important. Therefore we have mainly concentrated the logistics perspective from the British point of view in order to derive the strategies executed at war for the purpose of learning and explore avenues to apply them in practical perspective.

CONDUCT OF WAR

15. Argentines' underpinning interests to capture Falklands was driven by politically influenced objectives mainly to divert the public unrest already being mounted on Leopoldo Galteiri lead military junta government. Argentines were misjudged Britain's stance on Falklands. Leopoldo Galteiri was in a strong belief that British is not in a position to retaliate militarily against Argentina if they capture the Falklands due to the facts of economic recession prevailed in United Kingdom by that time along with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's decision downsizing the Royal Naval fleet as well as withdrawing lone Britain's ship HMS Endurance from south Atlantic.

16. Thus the campaign started by deploying Argentinean scrap- metal workers by Argentine Navy transport ship at Leith Harbour on 19 March 1982 on Northern side of South Georgia. Thirty five scientist of British Antarctic survey were also present there and noticed that they had raised the Argentinean flag. They reported the landing to the Governor of Falklands. In response British dispatched *HMS Endurance*, again to the area. Meanwhile another Argentine ship along with hundred troops augmented the landing of scrap workers. Two frigates also sailed to give protection to these landing and more ships including carrier and two destroyers were also put to sea.

17. Sailing of British Task Force. After getting intelligence report on Argentine invasion, British announced the sailing of Task Force. Subsequently, HMS Spartan was ordered to prepare to sail.

18. Operation Rossario. Argentine regular forces invaded Falklands under code named Operation ROSSARIO on 2nd April. Argentine forces, largely consisting of untrained conscripts in summer uniform got in to the mission without proper plan and strategies in place merely to capture the Islands seeking political benefits. The formidable terrain in the Falklands was further aggravated for troops to be sustained for longer period due to adverse cold weather condition. The possible military retaliation by British was grossly neglected by the Argentines and never had a plan B with regard to logistics in particular. They had very narrow two objectives to be achieved.

- a. To seize the marine barracks at Moody Brook (about two miles West of Port Stanley).

b. To capture the government house in Port Stanley.

19. On the arrival of Argentine force on Falklands, British Governor Rex Hunt, was then forced to surrender. There were no casualties on British side. However five more Argentine were killed and another seventeen suffered with casualties. Also Argentine forces put step to invade South Georgia as well upon invasion the Falklands.

20. UN passed resolution 502 demanding immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all Argentine forces. British under UN charter, was authorized to take measures in self defence in response to armed attack.

21. Imposing MEZ. British in response, declared a Maritime Exclusive Zone with 200 NMs radius which went into effect on arrival of *HMS Spartonon* on 12 April 1982.

22. Operation Corporate. British forces sailed from UK under the command of Admiral Woodward with the aim of repossession of Falkland Island on 5th April 1982. The code name given to the operation was CORPORATE. The task force first assembled at Ascension Island before sailing for the Falklands.

23. Operation Paraquat. Task Force (TF) having sailed out from Ascension Island was assigned their first mission of “Re-possession of South Georgia.” A small Task Group was formed on 25th April after a short preliminary shelling by British by 4.5 inch guns, Royal marine commandoes were landed by helicopters. Argentineans surrendered after two hours with a casualty of one sailor.

24. Attack on of Santa Fe. During the operation PARAQUATE British Wessex helicopter was able to find one of the Argentine submarine SantaFe while it was in a recce mission at the surface about five miles from South Georgia. The helicopter carried out depth charge attack which caused minor damage to the submarine. Subsequently, Lynx and Wasp helicopters renewed this attack. They fired Sea Skua and AS-12 missiles respectively and that hit the submarine but Santa Fe escaped from the area without exploding. SantaFe reached King Edward Harbour, where she was beached with list and leakage.

25. Blockade. After repossession of South Georgia, British government exerted pressure and imposed a total exclusive zone (TEZ) around Falklands which was effective from 30th Apr.

26. Operation Black Buck. The fighting at Falklands started with a predawn attack by dropping of 21 bombs on Port Stanley airfield by Vulcans on 1 May 1982. Vulcan taken nine-

hour fly from Ascension Island to reach the operational area. The attack was of limited success. One bomb cratered Port Stanley runway but did not deny use of the airfield to Argentine Hercules or Pucara aircraft. This mission was code named as BLACK BUCK. The main aim of this operation was to restrict Argentine air operation from Falklands.

27. Sinking of General Belgrano. The Argentine fleet was initially deployed in a defensive role. The fleet was divided into two task groups, one group comprising cruiser General Belgrano along with two destroyers was patrolling South West of British task force. On 2 May, at a range of less than three miles, British submarine HMS Conquerer fired Mark VIII torpedoes at the cruiser General Belgrano resulting sinks within 4 minutes. About 368 members of the crew of *General Belgrano* perished.

28. Sinking of HMS Sheffield. The British fleet comprising two carriers, destroyers and frigates were operating 50 – 100 NM of east of Falklands. *Sheffield* was on a radar picket duty South East of Falklands and about 20 miles in front of the rest of the fleet. On 4 May a Type 42 British destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was struck by an AM -39 *Exocet* missile, launched by Super Etendard at a range of about 23 NM. The fire and explosion instantly cut off most electric power, communications equipment, and all pressure to the *Sheffield's* fire hoses. Twenty members of the 286-man Sheffield crew were killed and 24 injured.

29. Raid on Pebble Island. After achieving some degree of Sea control, British TF conducted its first major land operation on 14-15 May. After heavy bombardment by, 4.5 inch guns 45 marine men launched to a hit and run raid on Pebble Island. They destroyed 11 aircraft, surveillance radar, fuel and ammunition dumps, before being evacuated by helicopters. This marked the preparation for landing to repossess the Islands. As the negotiations between the two countries collapsed, the ships marked for landing formed a convoy and sailed for San Carlos.

30. Landing at San Carlos. Port San Carlos site was selected keeping in view that:
- a. It was a deep water naval anchorage of about five miles, which was good for the ships in stormy conditions.
 - b. It was poorly defended by the Argentines
 - c. High grounds, suitable for the deployment of Rapier missile batteries
 - d. Surroundings hills provided excellent protection against ground operations.
31. During landing, the TF came under heavy air attacks by Argentine aircraft. However, these attacks were concentrated on escort ships rather than the amphibious vessels carrying troops. Major casualties included sinking of escorts Ardent, Antelope, Coventry and Precious Atlantic Conveyor.
32. Final assault. After San Carlos attack, British troops proceeded towards Goose Green and Darwin and on 14 June 1982. After three days of artillery bombardment British forces entered Port Stanley and hoisted white flag over there which after 74 days rigorous exercise. Argentine forces on Falkland were forced to surrender and 11400 soldiers were taken as Prisoners of War (POWs) and closed the chapter of Argentine struggle and Falklands.
33. The both parties were suffered more or less equally from this war and a summary of the losses is shown at Figure 1.

Description	British losses	Argentine losses
<u>Casualties</u>		
Killed	256	746
Wounded	777	11400
Captured	80	1336
<u>Equipment</u>		
Ships	6	2
Submarines	Nil	1
Air crafts	10	96
Helicopters	27	21
Cost of fighting	\$1.6 billion	\$1.6 billion

Figure 1 – Cost of the Falklands war

THE LOGISTICS OPERATION

Prelude to the mission on logistics

34. The Falklands is comprised with about 200 small Islands leading to a complex geographical atmosphere, extreme weather, rocky whale-backed hills. On the other hand almost none of the British's Task Force member had being to this strange Island which is 8000 NM away from the home before. This has been brought to notice by one retired US General Ken Privratsky in his book, Logistics in Falkland's war; that the insertion of the UK's special Boat Service in to Afghanistan in 2001 by helicopters and the 2003 invasion of Iraq were red carpet operations compare them with Falklands war. Similarly UK involvement for war in Kuwait in 1991 where a host nation Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided all the facilities needed by the coalition forces including docks, slipways, air fields, roads, fuel and even five star hotels for Royal Air force Air crew. The Falklands war was taken place at the southern hemisphere under extreme weather conditions and the troops were engaged 24/7 rigorous exercise. Also it involved typical amphibious operations where naval and landing force commanders together sea and air bone supply units had to work hand in glove taking accounts of each other's requirements at every stage to produce a joint plan. Unlike so called red carpet operations troops in Falklands had to take everything they need with them or capture it after arrival at such a formidable geographical terrain equally in sea and land. This was stem to have the necessity of having sound logistics backbone by the British themselves in particular due to the facts non alliance with countries in southern hemisphere as they were in non NATO zone .

35. Reviewing the literature on the British political stance on the military action against Argentina Prime Minister Thatcher had not had a near strategic decision or military readiness what so ever. However the announcement made to go against Argentina on 2 April 1982 was happen without any good appreciation owing to sudden invasion by argentinians. In this context moving all necessary men and material to a completely strange terrain far away from the home was not predicted adequately but whole country put their effort to arrange necessary logistics discretely but with sheer support.

36. Beside, British lacked what military leaders term forward presence near the Falklands Islands and they would likely receive no assistance from allies if it sent military units south. Most countries in the Southern hemisphere seemed likely to align with Argentina perhaps became openly hostile toward the British. Even major allies like United States might be non respond since the Reagan administration was actively trying to have a better relationship with Argentina at that time. In essence there were no supplies and no supporting service available anywhere between the United Kingdom and the Falklands striking the necessity of high level of logistics arrangement in place. The nearest possible support base available was Ascension Island, a small British protectorate in the middle of the Atlantic exactly midway between England and Falklands as you already know.

37. However the real challenges attached with a military action would require commitment of a sustainable sea-air-ground force, rapid deployment of both forces and equipment, establishment of a supply chain spanning the Atlantic and months of supplies. This was surely the main concern of John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence to formulate recommendation for Thatcher which is not hard to imagine both his concerns and trepidation about putting such a daunting mission before their military. However it is only the Admiral Henry Leach who convinced Thatcher that British task force could retake the Islands if required where all he needed was her approval.

38. Even though Admiral Leach was in such a confidence state, Britain at that time had no troop transports to move its military and few cargo-compatible ships to support them not even possess a hospital ship. However it proves that Thatcher and others apparently still had not grasped the challenge that lay ahead. When Thatcher asked Admiral Leach how long it would take for such a force to reach Falklands, he replied about 3 weeks. Clearly not grasping the distance and perhaps even the challenge the United Kingdom would face, Thatcher questioned, '3 weeks, you mean 3 days?' but Admiral Leach emphasized 'No, I mean 3 weeks'. The distance is 8000 NMs. This was happened on 31 March where it clarifies us the actual challenges embedded with logistics even the top most authority had not been realized until the last minute. However Admiral Leach was given the approval in principle by Thatcher following a meeting on 1 April which was lasted until the early hours on 2 April to prepare the Task force for the mission.

Mobilization and deployment

39. A series of simultaneous activities commenced immediately. Britain's response was swift, decisive but very much effective where it was noticeable immediately in cities and towns. People no sooner had read newspapers headlines on the morning of 2 April about an imminent invasion than they started witnessing hubs of array of logistics activity in many places. As proven in any operation that mobilization remains one of the greatest strategic achievements of the war because it enabled everything that followed. All started rather discretely and many organizations working quickly and together.

40. At that time Britain's lone ship Endurance, in the south Atlantic only had provisions to last another 3 weeks. On 27 March the RFA tanker Appleleaf then bound from Curacao to the United Kingdom with a full load of fuel received orders to divert to Gibraltar, to load further general stores and then to head south. Two days later the RFA stores ship Fort Austin received similar orders. Both ships packed with supplies not just for Endurance but also as contingency for other ships that might follow and need support. In subsequent weeks, dozens more support ships would follow in the wake of these two support vessels. The next pieces for that logistics backbone took to the air. A dozen C – 130 Hercules cargo aircraft took off from Royal Air Force bases in the UK in early hours of 3 April landed on the remote Island of Ascension. Aboard the first plane was a handful of Navy personnel with the mission to set up a forward operating base on Ascension Island for British forces heading south. That base became the salvation for British logistics and operational sustainment to forces in the south Atlantic.

41. The C-130s would start landing on Ascension later that day and commence offloading dozens of pallets of military equipment as the advance party managed storing. The hundreds of C – 130 cargo planes would follow in their trails throughout the month. Identifying the highest level of close eye vigilant Prime Minister Thatcher formed an inner cabinet known as the Overseas and Defence (South Atlantic) Committee to provide military advice particularly the logistics. The task related to securing transportation resources, providing loading assistance at ports and coordinating requirements between units, depots, docks and airfields were assigned to United Kingdom Land Force (UKLF).

42. A Naval Staff Advisory Group assembled to assess sealift capabilities to advise on options and ultimately to solve the ship shortage problem. The group was concerned overall about the size and readiness of Royal Fleet Auxiliary, a civilian operated agency in the MoD with responsibility for 27 support ships. More than half were tankers. One was a helicopter support vessel. Others performed various supply roles. The most important vessels within RFA at this time without doubt were six speciality ships named after the Knights of the round table. Known as Landing Ship Logistics or LSL each could carry over 300 troops, 16 main battle tanks, 34 assorted vehicles and 150 tons fuel and ammunition. They were designed to beaches from ramps at either bow or the stern. Helicopters could operate from their decks.

The names of those are flash in the screen

- a. LSL Sir Geraint
- b. LSL Sir Lancelot
- c. LSL Sir Percivale
- d. LSL Sir Galahad
- e. LSL Sir Tristram
- f. LSL Sir Bedivere

43. These six logistics ships and two landing platform docks HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid were compulsory for any amphibious landing. These shallow draft platforms roughly 60 feet long by 24 feet wide provided transport of supplies to shore and around beaches.

44. The LSLs and the rest of RFA however insufficient to meet the needs of large task force comprised several thousand of troops and the mountains of supplies. Since military had no passenger few cargo ships and Naval Force Advisory Group after having meeting with commercial ship owners concluded to acquire some commercial ships and modify to suit with military requirements. As a result the Queen signed the order on 4 April to acquire necessary ships. Those ships soon became known as STUFT for 'Ships Taken up from Trade'. In the next couple months a total of 54 such ships would be requisitioned for military use from 33 different civilian companies. Since most of the earmarked ships already under way according to their commercial plans, all were recalled to affect modifications where the docks were queuing by dozens of ships. This was further increased by another 30 commercial ships in next month

outnumbered war ships in the task force signifying the necessity, importance and dependability of the logistics auxiliaries.

45. Most STUFT spent less than a week in shipyard before sailing in their new configuration. The average conversion time per ship was 72 hours for 95% of the work. It is worthwhile to understand about some famous acquisitions such as, Norland was a typical large ship conversion. She was transformed in less than 4 days complete with 2 helipads as well as facilities to accommodate 800 – man parachute regiment. Similarly most famous STUFT was Queen Elizabeth II. She was set to sail to the Mediterranean with a full complement of cruise passengers. The container ship Atlantic Conveyor modified to be an aircraft ferry and cargo ship. She was fully capable of carrying and flying off Harrier jets and large Chinook helicopters. Her conversion provided an impressive display of what dockworkers and steelworkers could do in short order. But unfortunately Atlantic Conveyor would not return to the shores of England.

46. The complicated process of taking ships up from Trade to serve military purpose recognizes as one of the most impressive strategic success of the war. Therefore without industry and Government pulling together to solve logistics backbone by way of solving ships shortage, Britain could never have gone to war over the Falklands as it did.

47. UKLF being the sole responsibility authority for loading the logistics, the utilized about 1500 trucks to meet demands for movements, including over 100 vehicles hired from commercial carriers. Containers played no role and all cargo moved on pallets or loose in packs due to time constraints. Initially UKFL was able to load million ration packs and 12 million normal meals, nearly 10000 tons of ammunitions, 1260 tons of Petrol, Oil and Lubricants and 3880 tons of ordnance stores within 72 hours. Initial plans called for ten days supply of war reserves. That changed to thirty, then forty five and eventually settled at sixty.

Support Operations at Ascension Island, South Georgia Sea and final countdown

48. Whatever the challenges Ascension posed the British welcomed its ideal location and availability with open arms. They had no alternatives for providing operational sustainment to the taskforce heading toward the south Atlantic. Fortunately the continuing lease to America now left the Island open for British use. However the bottom line directive received to US Air Force military representative a Lieutenant Colonel controlling operation and to provide maximum support to British but not to get court doing it. Thus the British were able to obtain most of fuel required for their C-130 from US. Ascension Island played the far most vital role in keeping the task force sustains by receiving cargo from C-130 and issuing to ships in south.

49. The endurance of the C-130 planes was only 2000 miles depending on the payload. This meant unfortunately it could get only a quarter of the way to the Falklands from Ascension before having to turn around. They understood that if the endurance of C 130 is increased that would able to go southward ships and have air drops reducing the lead time of receiving essential provisions. In turn three modifications to the C-130 commenced to enable it to cover more distance by way of adding more fuel tanks on board. The ability of British to airdrop supplies in to the war zone permitted them reduce order receipt time for high priority items from about two weeks to less than two days. By the war's end high priority cargo out of Ascension, ranging from critical electronic components to missiles were being dropped of east Falkland within forty hours of request. The flights were exceeding 28 hours by then which was backed by two refueling from tanker Victor. It was lead to establish a world record by c-130 together with Victor.

50. Needless to say these logistical feats were not achieved without considerable braver on the part of pilots and dispatchers. The C-130 Hercules became the first prop-driven airplane to refuel from Britain's Victor tanker.

51. Retaking South Georgia on 24 April by British following paved the path to add forward sustainment base in addition to Ascension which is 900 miles away from Falklands. Unfortunately it was virtually inaccessible except very few areas. No docks or piers existed for berthing cargo ships. The Royal Navy by this time had earmarked several areas in the Atlantic to service vessels in the Task Force. Midway between Ascension and the Falklands, it established a

Replenishment and Consolidation Area for fleet auxiliary vessels to receive and issue supplies. On the North East edge of Total Exclusion Zone or TEZ a Tug, Repair and Logistics area (TRALA) provided a location where ships could receive supplies from support vessels. Also on the Eastern side of the TEZ a logistics loitering area (LLA) was planned for those ships maintain supplies for the Amphibious Task Force and then shuttle them to east Falklands.

52. Without going for counting the total cost involve for logistics to measure the magnitude of the operation, we can understand it looking at the cost involve for fuel in Black Buck Mission which was aimed to destroy airfield in Stanley strategically to stop air operations by Argentine in Falklands. Each of the Black Buck Mission required 80 air crewmen and 18 sorties flown by 15 Victor Tankers, a Nimrod surveillance plane and two Vulcan bombers in total necessitating 17 fuel transfers and consuming 2 million lb of fuel. This shows the complexity of the logistics operation and the cooperation required among different task groups.

53 There are three levels of logistics, just as three levels of war, Strategic, Operational and Tactical. Strategic logistics involves the readiness of industrial bases equipping and developing forces and the follow on support of those forces. Operational logistics involves the integration of logistics generally beyond the homeland across services and in support of military units seeking multiple objectives. Tactical logistic becomes the domain of battle fields where soldiers fight and some die in the execution of the battle plans. Executing logistics is a complex undertaking at all levels. And because things never turn ot as planned it becomes a continual process of re-evaluating and making adjustments as a combat changes and losses occur both forces and logistics wherewithal. It is never easy.

LESSONS LEARNT IN LOGISTICS PERSPECTIVE

54. The extreme stage of a conflict is would be a war but the result can be brought losses for each oppositions or mass scale damage for a single party than the rest of opposition. That is the nature of the war in brief. However, in material of the outcome the both wining and defeated parties can be realized their strength & weaknesses through their experiences. Based on the evaluation of strength & weaknesses everybody can formulate the lesson learnt during the war & that would be much benefited to make their future events a grand success. When we come to the war erupted in Falklands the lessons were significant particularly in logistics due to obvious reasons.

Lesson 1: Adopting swift strategic logistics action in place.

55. The British developed a flawless plan for mobilizing and deploying their forces. Their plan was built on their commitment to respond quickly to any crisis. They set a time limit on how long they could reasonably take to move forces to a theater, factored in their inherent strategic lift capability, figured out their lift shortcomings, and then developed a program to quickly requisition civilian ships to augment their strategic lift. It was proven by converting 54 commercial ships in to military suit vessels within a very short period of 2 weeks.

Lesson 2: Importance of adequate training prior live operation

56. The British never practiced for a major operation such as they executed in the Falklands. As a result, they made many mistakes and errors, some of which had tremendous impact on their ability to generate and sustain an offensive action to secure Port Stanley. Their execution phase errors are summarized as follows;

- a. Improper tactical loading
- b. Logisticians unaware of operational plan
- c. Improper assumption about amphibious landing
- d. Limited night off-load capability
- e. Poor planning data for consumables
- f. Lack of vehicles for logistics support
- g. Lack of heavy-lift helicopter capability

- h. Poor helicopter usage discipline
- j. New equipment deployed
- k. Casualty evacuation plans
- l. Poor assumptions on usable post-surrender facilities

57. All of above execution errors are indicators of a bigger problem. That bigger issue is that peacetime training and exercises are not logistically realistic and consequently do not help forces identify potential show-stoppers.

Lesson 3: Importance of integration of logistics & combat operations

58. The British units started their marches across East Falkland as logistics ships were preparing to move supplies around the west side. However care was taken by both commanders to get supplies in place before the battle for the mountains. Therefore battle for high ground surrounding Stanley remained effective.

59. The costly effects of not fully integrating logistics and tactics became evident twice during the war. In first instance, at Goose Green paratroopers went into battle with less support of supply than it needed. However after winning that fight the same paratroopers seized to advance quickly to Fitzroy since it would take nearly a week to get supplies & services to them.

Lesson 4: The level of expenditure of ammunition/ missiles was much higher than predicted.

60. The senior British land force logistician in the campaign afterwards calculated that in the land battle, ammunition expenditure was four times the planned rate on average; and five times the planned rate for 105mm high explosive shells and 81mm mortar rounds. During the Goose Green, British gunners stopped firing because they had no more ammunition. Further, during the operation helicopters & Harriers drank consumed much fuel & some day they struggled to meet requirements.

Lesson 5: Need to improve logistical support for British operations outside the NATO area.

61. The British won chiefly because of their ability, in an improvised military campaign for which they had no prior planning, to project and sustain a Task Force consisting of a Carrier Task Group and an Amphibious Task Group across a distance of over 12,000 kilometers. The intensity of anti air, antisubmarine, shore bombardment, and, once troops were ashore, artillery activity, demanded a continuous flow of supplies. To meet this demand, the British were forced to use stores earmarked for NATO contingencies too.

Lesson 6: Importance of effective logistics Communication

62. Sometimes superiors in UK did not understand the priorities for supply ships & with that logisticians became frustrated. During the some critical period of the amphibious landings most operational & logistics task group had communication problems. Logisticians frequently had no communication since they lacked a separate radio net to relay logistics information higher. As a result of that issues face to face meeting become the norm of logistics operations. The requirement of a logistics coordinating officer onboard supply ships to establish priorities & coordinates requirement of land force they were recognized later on & action taken.

Lesson 7: Importance distribution of supplies on time

63. Operational level logistics remained effective for the Argentine military despite not having ocean shipping at its disposal. Following their capture of the Falklands, the Argentines poured troops and military supplies into the islands. A considerable stock of weapons and ammunitions was built up. However, the Argentine military command in the Falklands was unable to properly distribute the supplies and Weapons; hence troops in the field, were critically short of some items that were available in abundance at supply dumps in the Falklands.

64. The break down in the Argentine supply chain occurred out ward from Stanley at the tactical level, as commanders simply failed to get supplies forward to units. The Argentine Army had been relying on helicopter resupply as well. After British destroyed 10 of their helicopters, forward distribution of supplies became more difficult, and commanders in Stanley failed to find other solutions.

65. The challenges for British logisticians were also to get supplies to where they were needed. Events largely outside their control, coupled with a lack of dedicated transportation,

initially inhibited their ability to supply units. To overcome that they used to stacks of supplies in the cargo hold ships and that access would be easier and discharge quicker during the assault. At some time they disembarked troops at South Georgia and headed back ship Queen Elizabeth II to England with tons of supplies because of the difficulty of removing them from the bottom of the ship. In another instance they were changed discharge plan of LSLs to prevent double handling of stock by logisticians. Sometime after D Day logisticians waited at the anchorage in day & night to learn those ships was needed elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

66. The Falklands war had been taken place in 1982 where the most of countries in the world had already been understood the narrow objectives of the war and the danger of the consequences after experiencing catastrophic World War II. But yet we still saw nations had not wanted to get away seeking solutions through military means. The Falklands war is the classic and real world experience to prove that nearly four decades after the World War II. The following recommendations are identified upon evaluating the logistics related affairs in the Falklands war.

a. To identify the Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats posed by the organization in order to combat the problem in hand. The British were shown high level of experience in the field, to enter in to the scene where they have analyzed the Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats they being posed and act accordingly.

b. To design the objectives with benchmark attributes where these should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time bound. We identify the objectives to be SMART. The British set their objectives with clear plan in place and able to achieve one by one successfully.

c. To assign tasks identifying the leaders. In theory we have learnt that the leaders are borne not made. But some scholars argue that leaders can made, but yet the charisma displayed by the military leaders were immensely contributed at every quarters in the Falklands war where their leadership traits were the key to success in many operations. Therefore we would rather keep open this argument the leaders are borne as it is for your personnel debate and yet we name few charismatic leaders like King Vijaya, King Dutugemunu, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonapart, Alexander the Great, and also some contemporary leaders Lee Kuan Yew, Dr. Mahatir Mohomad and Nelson Mandela for further support to our argument.

d. To identify the synergy effect of the team to gain the advantage in the events like war. The British effort in the logistics and the campaign in Falklands were imperative and

the effort they have put having after spent 8000 miles from the home land was remarkable in the annals of the history of the wars.

67. The success or the failure is depending on how best you have evaluated the problem. The decision to solve it should follow deliberate thinking and must have a strategy to achieve. This strategy must brief to everyone in the link without a tiny mark of doubt enabling to monitor and control the progress until achieve the expected results. The British has shown this by way of appointing various task groups, committees and many tactical arrangements with thorough briefing at every level from highest political level to lowest level in the order of command.

CONCLUSION

68. The most lasting impression one gets from the Falklands war, is that the British were simply better than the Argentines they fought. From bottom to top ranks, there were vast differences between the militaries of the two nations. British armed services were voluntary and professional, and had trained under difficult conditions in the past. Argentina's consisted mostly of conscripts, many with little training and without the camaraderie of units with heritages centuries old. British senior leaders may not have held a common view of events on a daily basis, but they shared a vision of where they must win the war and what could cause them to lose it. The Argentine junta misjudged British resolve, and its commanders failed to develop a coherent strategy to defeat the Task force or to take advantage of opportunities on the battle field.

69. However at the inception the British forces was struggling particularly on tactical logistics due to limited time they had for planning & preparations despite Admiral Leach was confident sailing the troops to Falklands theatre for mission. The British merely had to overcome all challenges posed from adverse sea, formidable land terrain and especially being at a non NATO zone. Therefore under this unfavourable conditions one could realize the fatal fate would have been unfold for British if they also had not facilitated with adequate logistics provisions. Even though with the competitive advantage possess by Argentines in terms of the distance from home, they were not able to win the battle due to poor logistics configuration. During the battle Argentines had poor logistics integration with battle field and it resulted to cutoff their supply routes automatically with the less interference of enemy. Argentines were not able to supply ammunitions & food to the troops who were really needed even they had with full of stocks at rear link. That was showcased the incapability of their logisticians which directly caused to jeopardize the morale fact of the troops engaged.

70. However Britain's commandos, paratroopers, soldiers, sailors and airmen all had their moments of glory with well integrated logistics supplies even under tough fighting conditions in the Falklands war. All of them were backed up by thousands of men and women working behind the scene thousands of miles away, trying getting them what they needed. Together they made the victory possible reminding us again and again one of well-known quotation of Sun Tsu, "In the war any one can see the tactics but no one can see the strategy behind".